

AFIT/GAL/LAL/97S-2

**THE LOGISTICS OF MOBILIZING
AND SUPPLYING THE UNION ARMY
DURING THE INITIAL STAGES OF
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR**

THESIS

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THESIS

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Abstract

This thesis studies the logistics involved in mobilizing and supplying the Union Army at the onset of the Civil War. The main elements discussed are the sources, procedures, and items needed for the mobilization and supply effort.

Initially, the Union relied on the States to mobilize the military with the majority of the military being militia members or volunteers. The number of volunteers declined later in the war and the Union used both the bounty system and the draft for recruitment. Eventually, the Federal Government replaced the States as the primary mobilizing entity. The military needed supplies of weapons, clothing, and food. Again the States were the primary providers of supplies. The Union later used domestic and foreign markets for supplies, but the urgency of the nation spawned fraud and corruption. Additionally, the majority of the supplies provided were not adequate for the environment of war. By the end of war, corruption decreased and quality increased.

Today's military can use the actions of the Union as guidance of what to do and what not to do in the time of war. The actions of the Union during the Civil War should be used as a template for future generations.

THE LOGISTICS OF MOBILIZING AND SUPPLYING THE UNION ARMY DURING THE INITIAL STAGES OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

I. Background and Methodology

Relative Background

In 1861, a major war in American history began. Unlike in previous wars, America was not fighting an enemy from a foreign land, but instead was fighting its neighbors. Brother versus brother; cousin versus cousin; countryman versus countryman: the nation had been divided by the separation of the South from the Union, but with the firing at Fort Sumter, the United States entered into the bloodiest conflict in American history: the Civil War. The landscape of American experience was forever changed.

At the onset of the American Civil War, the Union Army of the North had many hurdles to traverse. Unlike the active military that is enjoyed by the United States of today, the military at the time of the Civil War was small. After the War of 1812, the United States reduced the size of its armed forces to the pre-war level. Just prior to the beginning of the Civil War, the United States had under 20,000 men in the regular army. Not only was the size of the military a problem, the location of these troops posed a problem. A majority of the troops were in the western frontier. The United States had

the unenviable task of beginning a war with relatively few soldiers spread from ocean to ocean.

The task of the Union government to prepare for the war was two-fold. First, soldiers had to be mobilized. The question arose as to the ideal size to fight a productive war. In accordance with this was the question of who would provide the troops to fight. Despite the fact that the nation was called the United States, this was an inaccurate term at this time in history. In this era, each state believed in its own rights. But despite their differences, the states had at least one objective in common. They all had a common opponent, the South.

Because the Federal Government was not fully prepared to provide troops, the states themselves became the main precipitators of mobilizing the forces. Each state called for troops to turn back the opposing army. By the time the Federal Government set forth its request for a national militia, the states were ready, willing, and able to meet the demands set upon them. In fact, they were able to provide more men than the Federal Government required (Shannon, 1928).

The second task belonging to the Union to prepare for the war was to supply the soldiers with the necessary rations, clothing, weapons, and other miscellaneous needs. Again the states took the lead in this department (Huston, 1966). Supplies were provided until the Federal Government could provide what was needed. The practices of supply were not always ethical at the onset of the war, but as time went on, the supply system was generally able get the right items to the right place at the right time.

The conversion from peace to war is always difficult. It is even more so when the military is small and the Federal Government is severely impaired to meet requirements for troops and supplies. Both the North and South had a difficult time during the initial stages of the Civil War. One might assume that the North would have been better prepared and equipped than the South, because the North had an existing army for a much longer period of time and controlled most of the industrial base of the nation. In truth, the South was the leader in providing troops and supplying their needs at the beginning. It was some time for the United States Federal Government to properly provide for its troops. The first year of the war was difficult and troublesome, but by the end of the first year, the Federal Government was far better prepared to meet the demands. As the war continued, the North gained many advantages over the South and eventually forced the surrender of the Confederate forces when General Lee surrendered at the Appomattox Court House in 1865.

General Issue

In any war, it is necessary to mobilize and supply the military. Mobilization is necessary to recruit the soldiers needed and to ensure they are properly positioned to conduct a war. Once the soldiers have been mobilized, they then need to be supplied. If an army does not get the right items to the right place at the right time, it can not survive a war. The actions taken by the Union Army during the initial stages of the Civil War to mobilize and supply the military were essential for the Union to conduct a successful military campaign.

Reviewing the Civil War can provide many insights that could prove to be beneficial. From a logistical standpoint, the Civil War was a tremendous challenge. Cooperation and coordination between the States and the Federal Government was essential to conduct a successful military campaign. The Civil War provides an opportunity to investigate a period in military history where a country needed to transform from peace to war. In addition, the Civil War demonstrates how the United States went from a small active military to one that could defeat its enemies. By examining what transpired, the strategy-makers of today's military, a military constantly reducing its numbers, can learn what to do and what not to do in the area of providing and supplying the necessary personnel for war. Both erroneous and fortuitous tactics and strategies provide guidance for generations to come. The Civil War had a profound effect on the conscience of the American populace and the future of the nation. By studying what occurred, one obtains a better sense of our country's history, and in addition, one is then allowed the opportunity to apply what was learned to enhance today's military and society as a whole.

Research Objectives

This thesis discusses the logistical aspects of the Civil War, concentrating on the Union Army of the North. The main focus of this work concentrates on the mobilization of the Union Army and the supplying of this army. Since the Civil War is an intensely broad and multifaceted subject, my efforts focus on three areas. First, I analyze the logistics system that existed just prior to the commencement of the war. This provides a

effective background as to the situation the Northern Army faced when the war began.

The second area that I analyze is the status of the Union's logistics when the war began, concentrating on mobilization and supply of the soldiers. The third section that I analyze is how logistical efforts changed during the first year of the war. This information provides a basis of comparison to ascertain what improvements, if any, the Union made in providing troops and supply clothing, food, and weapons to ensure the survival of the forces.

Investigative Questions

Many questions could be asked in regards to the Civil War. For the purposes of my research, I concentrate on answering four main questions that I believe are important and could provide valuable insight to the military logistics of today. The following are the questions I answer as a result of the research conducted to complete the thesis:

1. Prior to the Civil War, how prepared was the Union Army to fight a war?
How were the logistical objectives of the military met?
2. Were the early attempts of mobilizing the Union Army successful? How were they performed? If these attempts were unsuccessful, how were they changed to meet demand?
3. Were the early attempts of supplying the Union Army successful? Who were the primary suppliers of the military forces? How did these attempts change during the first year of the war?

4. How successful was the Union Army able to convert from peacetime to war?
5. What are the lessons that today's military can learn from the actions taken to mobilize and supply the Union Army during the early stages of the Civil War?

Methodology

As with any historical work, the research for this thesis consists of acquiring and analyzing many sources. During a qualitative research, two main sources of information are available to the researcher. The first source of information is the primary sources written by officials of the military or the participants of the Civil War. The primary sources give a first hand account of what actually happened during the war. The second source is the secondary books or papers written since the war to analyze what occurred. These sources can provide a great deal of important information, but if the researcher is not careful, it may be difficult to determine if the information is truly factual or tainted with prejudice. My primary research focus is a concentration of the secondary sources. By analyzing the works of scholars who have researched an era of American history that is well over a century old, I attempt to answer the research questions by drawing on the collective knowledge of those before me. Primary sources are valuable assets, but since the topic has been studied for decades, the secondary sources can be just as valuable when used correctly. When possible, the primary sources are utilized to enhance the work in development.

The first step of my research consists of Internet and library inquiries. The Internet did not provide the type of information I needed, so the majority of my research

was library searches. My initial searches for books on mobilization and supply turned up little, so I adjusted my search to the issue of logistics and the Civil War. From this search I was able to find sources that included the issues of mobilization and supply.

From the bibliography section of the first books, I was able to find more specific sources on the mobilization and supply efforts of the Union army. Additionally I contacted J Matthew Gallman, the author of "The North Fights the Civil War: The Home Front," via email and asked him to recommend sources to study. Dr. Gallman provided me with some insights on additional sources for my topic. The next step was to collect the relevant information. From these two sections, I proceeded to my conclusions and answered the investigative questions.

Thesis Overview

Chapter I: Background and Methodology. This section of the thesis contains the relative background of my subject, the questions that are answered as a result of my research, and the methodology used to conduct research. The purpose of the background information is to give the reader a brief description of the problem and to give a synopsis of what follows. Included in this section is a description of the importance of the research being undertaken. The methodology defines the steps and processes used to conduct my research.

Chapter II: Union Mobilization. This chapter examines the logistics behind the mobilization of the Union Army during the Civil War with a concentration on the initial stages of the war. The main purpose of this chapter is to serve as the narrative and

literature review of the events of the war in regards to the Union mobilization effort before the war, at the beginning of the war, and over the first few years of the war. The actions taken to mobilize the Union Army during the Civil War aided later armies and the lessons learned can help today's military.

Chapter III: Union Supply. This chapter examines the logistics behind the supply of the Union Army during the Civil War with a concentration on the initial stages of the war. The main purpose of this chapter is to serve as the narrative and literature review of the events of the war in regards to the supply effort of the Northern Army before the war, at the beginning of the war, and over the first few years of the war. The Civil War provided the North with a large logistics nightmare. It was a daunting task for a nation with a small military and a relatively small federal bureaucracy to meet the economic and logistical issues presented.

Chapter IV: Findings and Conclusions. This section gathers all information obtained to answer the research questions and provides the conclusions to my research.

II. Union Mobilization

Introduction

Many events precipitated the Civil War, but one event in particular gave the South an apparent justification to leave the Union. This event was the election of Abraham Lincoln as the President of the United States. Lincoln did not win the election by many votes and benefited from the growing separatist attitude in the nation with a distinct difference between the North and the South. Lincoln won the popular vote in the North and the West capturing 54% of the total voting population. Lincoln received 180 of the possible 183 electoral votes from the free states. Additionally, Lincoln swept the North and West by receiving 54% of the vote and more than 60% of the vote in the upper North. On the other hand, Lincoln won only 40 percent of the overall popular vote (Gallman, 1994: 6). In any election, the winning candidate does not have to win the popular vote. The winner is the individual who has the majority of votes from the electoral college. Lincoln received only 40% of the popular vote, but still won the election due to his superior numbers in the electoral college.

Lincoln did not appear on many of the southern ballots thus showing this region's distaste of Lincoln as a presidential candidate. The South did not want Lincoln as president because he wanted to keep the territories slave free. Additionally, Lincoln believed that the nation would not be able to stay half slave and half free for long. Sooner or later the nation would have to come to a final decision on the issue of slavery.

The South reacted to his election by taking the first steps towards two separate nations. Lincoln appeared to Southerners to be a threat because of his views of slavery. The South Carolina secession convention stated, "A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and all the States north of that line have united in the election of a man to the high office of President of the United States whose opinions and purposes are hostile towards slavery" (Rawley, 1974: 9).

In December of 1860, South Carolina voted to secede from the Union and soon many states joined the state. In February of 1861, the newly-separated southern states formed the Confederate States of America with Jefferson Davis as president. Davis almost immediately authorized the formation of an army of 100,000 men. Only three months after the election of Lincoln, the nation was divided in two.

The North was determined to bring peace to the situation and offered many proposals to appease the South. Many people in the North were willing to do whatever was possible to make the South happy if it meant the Union would remain intact. The first proposal was to annex Cuba. This action was something that the Southern states wanted for years. A second measure was to extend the accords of an existing law, the Missouri Compromise, all the way to the Pacific Ocean. This provision would have continued the right of slavery south of the 36° 30' line. A third measure was to protect the right of slavery in Washington DC. There was also the offer to guarantee the interstate slave trade and enforce the Fugitive Slave Law (Gallman, 1994: 9). During his First Inaugural Address, Lincoln showed his political position in many areas. Lincoln had no intention of interfering with slavery in the states and did not object to a

constitutional amendment guaranteeing slavery in the states thus forever protecting this right from Federal interference. The South believed peace between the two nations would happen soon because the leaders in the South did not think Lincoln would object to the separate nations (Nevins, 1959: 15). Lincoln did object and furthermore he deemed the secession of the South as anarchy and rejected the political theory of the Confederacy (Rawley, 1974: 10-11). Over the course of the war, Lincoln's opinions changed in regards to slavery. For many reasons, Lincoln abolished slavery later in the war with his Emancipation Proclamation.

Lincoln directed actions on 30 March 1861 to reinforce Fort Sumter and Florida's Fort Pickens. The relief mission departed on 4 April, but no armed men were a part of the mission. Only supplies were to be delivered to the army posts. By not having any armed troops on the relief mission, Lincoln was able to show the South that the mission was not one of war, but of humanity. The course of action was dictated by the actions of South Carolina. If the soldiers attacked, a war was sure to start. If they let the supplies arrive at Fort Sumter, the fort could survive indefinitely and the Union would have a strong force within the Southern territory (Gallman, 1994: 11-12). On 11 April 1861, before the relief ship could arrive, the South demanded the surrender of Fort Sumter. The Union soldiers refused to surrender and at 0430, 12 April 1861, Confederate forces fired on Fort Sumter. Three days later, Lincoln called the nation to arms and the Civil War had begun.

The stage was not set for a war between the states. The Union had to mobilize and supply an army to fight the war against former countrymen. This chapter examines

the logistics behind the mobilization of the Union Army during the Civil War with a concentration on the initial stages of the war. The main purpose of this chapter is to serve as the narrative and literature review of the event of the war in regards to the mobilization effort.

Mobilization and the Civil War

Mobilization is defined as “the assembling and organizing of troops, materiel, and equipment for active military service in time of war or other national emergency” (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955). Successful mobilization is essential to operate a successful military campaign. Without it, the troops and equipment needed to support these troops will not get to where they is needed and a war could be lost. The Union mobilized its men to fight the war, but the way in which the Union conducted this mobilization changed during the course of the war. The way the Union conducted this mobilization and the way the method of mobilization changed are discussed in the chapter to follow. The Union wastransformed from an entity which relied on volunteers to one that had to draft the men necessary to carry on a successful war.

Pre-Civil War Mobilization. After the war with Mexico, the United States military demobilized to pre-war levels. Unlike earlier periods in American history, the United States military was spread around the nation from sea to sea. After the Revolutionary War, the United States was small with only thirteen states all located in relatively the same geographical region. After the War of 1812, the United States was still small and not as separated as was the nation before the Civil War began. The nation

had to combine all resources to unite and fight an organized war. The military was widely dispersed in the years prior to the Civil War and by the time 1850 came around, there were only 2,000 soldiers east side of the Mississippi River and about 6,400 west of the Mississippi.

Additionally, the American military had shifted to a more professional organization prior to the Mexican War, and became more so after the war with Mexico. According to Koistinen, "professionalization continued through improved instruction at home and through American officers studying and reporting on military developments abroad" (98). Being a member of the active military became not only a duty to defend the nation, but more of a profession. The years preceding the Civil War and the war itself brought about the development of the professional mentality of the military. The attitudes and behaviors of today's military can be traced back to the Civil War, when the attitudes shaped the direction of the military of today and possibly beyond.

By 1860, the uneven balance of the American soldiers in the west and the east was even more dramatic. At this point in time, there were less than 1,000 troops in the eastern section of the country and over 13,000 stationed in the western frontier of the United States. The Department of the West was comprised of Texas, New Mexico, Utah, Oregon, and California (Huston, 1966: 155). The active duty army was organized into 19 regiments and from 1849 - 1861, it was rare for there to be a battalion of regulars together at any one time (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955: 88). In other words, the United States had a relatively small military establishment that was widely disseminated. The militia was becoming a smaller force than it was in the early wars of the United States. The militia

was a failure during the War of 1812 and misused during the Mexican War. The militia still existed, but in far fewer numbers than at any other time in American history (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955: 90). Also, there was no such thing as systematic war planning or logistics planning prior to the Civil War. These problems caused problems when the nation entered the Civil War. Rawley states, "The nation's sword had grown rusty and its purse empty" (1974: 16).

Union Demographics. The demographics at the beginning of the Civil War show a large difference in strengths between the North and the South. The nation as a whole had a population of approximately 28 million people. The free states of the North had around 19 million people while the Southern states had about 9 million. The slave states that did not join the South added approximately 3.2 million more people to the North. Of the 9 million people in the South, 3.2 million were slaves and could therefore not be counted upon to fight the war because of the Southern beliefs. The military age for the Civil War was set for men between the ages of 18 and 45. The North had about 3 million men of military age while the South had approximately 1 million (Gallman, 1994: 22-23).

The North was superior in the areas of railroads, manufacturing, foodstuffs, and financial networks (Gallman, 1994: 24-25). The North was also superior in the number of iron furnaces, value of firearms, number of horses, and number of locomotives. In 1860, the North had 111,000 manufacturing establishments which employed 1,300,000 workers. On the other hand, the South had 18,000 manufacturing establishments employing 111,000 workers (Rawley, 1974: 28). Approximately 90 percent of the

nation's manufacturing output in 1860 came from the Northern states. The North's production of cotton and woolen textiles was seventeen times greater than that of the South. The production of boots and shoes was thirty times higher; the production of pig iron was twenty times higher; and the North's production of firearms was thirty-two times greater than the South. The North had a very large advantage in the area of transportation in both existing resources and the ability to expand. As of 1860, the North had twenty thousand miles of railroads. The South in comparison had only half of this total. Additionally the North had about twenty-four times the number of locomotives when compared to the South. The North also had the greater capacity to produce more track and rolling stock (Gallman, 1994: 24). At the beginning of the war, "the North's real and personal property was three times greater than that of the South" (Koistinen, 1996: 102). Additionally, the North had three times as much railroad mileage than the South.

All of these areas show that the North had superior numbers when compared to the South, but the apparent advantage did not mean it was more prepared to fight the war. Numbers can be deceiving, though. In most cases, whoever has the apparent advantage in terms of the numbers wins the battle. This is not always true, and at the beginning of the Civil War, it was not true either. The South was more prepared at the beginning of the war than was the North and the South also had a clear and defined purpose. The superior numbers in the North "helped insulate Northerners from the economic hardships that the Confederate home front later endured" (Gallman, 1994: 26). The North had the ability to survive a longer war than did the South. A strong attitude and effort can win the short

race or battle, but sustainment and endurance will win the marathon or the war. The Civil War became a marathon and the North won because of its advantages. Numbers alone don't win the war, but combined with strong leadership and effective war tactics, numbers help an army win a war.

The extensive financial network enjoyed by the North aided in North's transition to war. The North had a substantial private manufacturing base and a well-developed market system. When compared to the South, the North had superior wealth and a better financial structure to use this wealth for the betterment of national needs. In 1860, the nation had 1,642 banks and branches and the North had 1,421 of these in northern states. These means that approximately 86.6% of the banks in the entire nation (Gallman, 1994: 26). The Northern banking structure went through extreme changes as the war progressed, but the private sector funds aided the North's war effort from the beginning. The ability to supply funds for a war can sustain a war effort in the same way as demographic advantages. This is what happened in the Civil War. The deep pockets of groups and individuals funded the war and enabled the Union Army to succeed.

The North vs. The South. An assumption going into the war was that the Union would have a more powerful military establishment based on the its longer history of being a country in comparison to the Confederate States of America. According to Gallman, the "United States Army was hopelessly unprepared to embark on a major war when Fort Sumter fell" (Gallman, 1994: 32). The South had to build its army from nothing, but the South had many people who had military experience. The war with Mexico was largely "the instigation of expansionist Southerners, and the volunteers for

that conflict came disproportionately from the slave states” (Gallman, 1994: 32).

General Robert E. Lee, a West Point graduate, resigned his commission in the Union Army and choose to side with the land of his birth and heritage. Many other West Point graduates resigned from the Union army and joined the fight from the side of the South. Additionally, between the years of 1849 and 1860, all of the Secretaries of War for the United States came from the South. When the war began all of these men defected to serve in the Confederacy (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955: 84). The loss of some of the best leaders in the military presented the Union with a large a deficit from which it would take time to recover.

There was also a distinct difference in the goals of the Union and the Confederacy. Both sides wanted to win the war, but for far different reasons. The South’s goal upon entering the war was to survive as an independent nation. The Confederate mission was not to gain additional territory, but to keep what the South already had when the South seceded from the Union. The South did not need to overwhelm the North or conquer new territory. The accomplishment of this goal could have simply been accomplished by digging in and defending their lands. If the South had attempted to only hold ground, the morale of the South would have dwindled. The goal of the Union was to force the surrender of the South and reestablish the nation as a single entity. In other terms, Koistinen believes “the North set about to crush the South, and the Confederacy attempted to win by not losing” (102). To accomplish this goal, the burden of attack fell on the North. This burden required the North to provide more men to fight and to take the war to its enemies. The requirement would be “roughly three times as

many men and resources...This was almost exactly equal to the advantage enjoyed by the North" (Gallman, 1994: 33). Having clearer goals aided the South at the beginning of the war and hurt the Union for the lack of such goals.

Initial Mobilization. The catalyst for the onset of the hostilities between the North and the South was the surrender of Fort Sumter on 14 April 1861. According to Gallman, the day after the surrender, 15 April 1861, President Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to serve for three months in the defense of the United States and thus began the American Civil War (Gallman, 1994: 12). Huston called these volunteers members of the militia (Huston, 1966: 160). Rawley says that the 75,000 militiamen were called upon to "suppress illegal combinations in the seven seceded states and to enforce the laws" (Rawley, 1974: 18). The leaders in the north had distinct reasons why they requested the numbers of troops.

At the beginning of the war, Lincoln's call for 75,000 men to fight the war suggested that he was anticipating a short war (Huston, 1966: 160-161). Lincoln bound himself to the Militia Act of 1795 and of 1803. The Militia Act of 1795 authorized the president to call the militia of any state or multiple states whenever the laws of the United States are opposed by any opponent too powerful to defeat under normal circumstances. The militia could be used up to thirty days after the commencement of the next session of Congress. Additionally, militiamen could serve no longer than three months in a period of one year. The second Militia Act, approved on 3 March 1803, allowed the president to call the militia to defend the law and order in the District of Columbia (Shannon, 1928:

29-30). The initial call of men from the militia was in accordance with the above acts. Other men offered their services, volunteering to defend the Union.

Volunteerism by the American population was a major player during the Civil War. Men by the thousands offered their lives to defend and protect their country. Women volunteered their time and efforts to support the army fighting the war. From groups of people to the individuals, without the volunteers, the military would never have been able to accomplish what it did.

This situation changed later in the war when, in July 1862, Congress passed the Militia Act authorizing the president to call out the militia for 9 months with quotas to be distributed among each state (Gallman, 1994: 47). Another determining factor was that General Winfield Scott, the General in Chief of the United States Army at the beginning of the Civil War, requested the size of the military to be 85,000 men. This number was to be divided into 25,000 regular troops and 60,000 volunteers. Scott believed this number of men would be necessary "to open the Mississippi River and conduct an enveloping land campaign in conjunction with a tight naval blockade to strangle the South into submission" (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955: 91). At the onset of the Civil War, the regular army was manned at 16,000 men. Combining the number requested by Lincoln, the Union army would have a force of 92,000 men. By asking for this many troops, Lincoln requested over 7,000 more men than Scott estimated was needed. This number, while a smaller number of soldiers than that would be needed in the war effort, was more than General Scott requested (Huston, 1966: 160). The Union initially accepted a total of 91,816 men into service (Weigley, 1967: 200).

The troops were called for only 90 days mainly because most people believed that the war would be short and the troops would soon be home. A South Carolina senator, for instance, stated that he would “drink any blood shed by the conflict,” and an editor of the Charleston Mercury stated that he would “eat any bodies that fell during the war” (Gallman, 1994: 13). These quotes represent the attitude at the time. The entire nation soon discovered that a short war would not happen and both sides would have to fight a long and sustained war.

After his initial request of troops in May of 1861, Lincoln expanded the size of the regular army to 22,000 troops and did so without Congressional approval. Along with this act, Lincoln also called for additional volunteers by asking for 42,000 volunteers to serve for three years (Huston, 1866: 161). Lincoln, also without the approval of Congress, directed the Secretary of the Treasury to advance \$2 million to various groups to purchase supplies for the troops. In April of 1861, Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus which allowed for arrests without charges in parts of the North and the border states. Along with this action, Lincoln enacted measures to expand Federal Government including conscription, taxation, and banking. Many people objected to these actions, but during the first summer of the war, most stood by their president (Gallman, 1994: 20). Additionally, Lincoln directed naval commandants in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston to charter or purchase ships for defense purposes. Lincoln gave power to the Governor of New York to act for the Secretaries of War and Navy in making all arrangements necessary for the transportation of troops and munitions (Huston, 1966: 160-161). Congress did not become involved with the war effort until almost three

months into the action. Lincoln retained the power to do as he desired to acquire what was needed for the military.

The response of the nation to Lincoln's call to arms was overwhelming. In fact this became a major concern to the Federal Government. How was the Federal Government going to provide for this influx of manpower? The Federal Government was required to meet the needs of this outpouring of troops. "As frequently has been the case, troop mobilization so far outdistanced materiel mobilization as to impair the effectiveness of the whole undertaking" (Huston, 1966: 161). The reasons people volunteered varied. For some it was a sense of national pride and patriotic enthusiasm. For others it was the lure of adventure or the urge for vengeance against a common enemy. But whatever the reason, there was no shortage of people wanting to volunteer. "New recruits were caught up in a festive air created by rallies and speeches that were organized in their wards and townships" (Geary, 1991: 6). Men, believing the war would end quickly, volunteered in mass numbers in order to not miss the opportunity of defending the nation (Nevins, 1959: 87-88).

The militiamen and the other volunteers who responded first reported to gathering points in their respective states and waited to be transported to Washington DC. When the troops first arrived in Washington DC, they encountered a surprise. What awaited them was a Union government ill-prepared for the incoming troops. Normal facilities were not available and the troops were housed in public buildings, improvised barracks, or poorly constructed and organized training camps. In fact, the early arrivals had the

task of building the facilities from the ground up. A regular army quartermaster brought in the wood for construction and the new recruits went to work building camp.

A wide variety of barracks was constructed. Some of the barracks looked like long hog houses, while others were more elaborate with upright walls beneath the gable roof. The barracks usually held one or sometimes two companies. A typical regimental camp was designed as follows: an officer's barracks fronting the parade ground, a row of between ten and twelve troop barracks spaced roughly twenty feet apart, a cook shack behind each building, and stables further in the rear if the unit was a cavalry unit (Huston, 1966: 161-162). The actions of the men who constructed the early camps shows what can be done when needed.

During the first 80 days of the Civil War, mobilization occurred without any special federal legislation. The Federal Government did not become fully involved until after the First Battle of Bull Run on 21 July 1861. The Union Army suffered a staggering defeat at the hands of the Confederacy and the results of this battle served as a wake-up call to the nation, and the Federal Government began to redouble its commitment to the war. The First Battle of Bull Run proved that the Union could be beaten. It then became a high priority to ensure the North would not lose the war (Nevins, 1959: 223). During the early months of the war, many northern civilians had not perception of the realities of the war. Many thought the war was a game or a place for amusement. Often people rode in their carriages to the battlefields. Once there, the people picnicked while watching the war. When the war began to be perceived as a serious event, the civilians realized the

war front was not place for picnicking or for entertainment. The war was serious and had to be treated as such (Gallman, 1994: 21).

The Federal Government failed at taking the lead in the mobilization efforts for many reasons. The years before the war were not good for the War Department. Under President Buchanan, the department began to fail. Buchanan's first Secretary of War was John B. Floyd. Floyd was from the South and later in the war was a secessionist. His mismanagement of the War Department kept the department confused and unable to accomplish anything. Joseph Holt was Floyd's replacement, but he served only a short period of time and was ineffective. Over thirty percent of the War Department's staff left Federal Government service or joined the Southern cause either before or after the war began. Lincoln compounded the problems of the War Department by selecting Simon Cameron as the new secretary. Cameron was a political appointee and was inept and ineffective for this important position (Koistinen, 1996: 132-133). The problems did not begin to subside until Stanton was chosen as Cameron's replacement later in the war (Koistinen, 1996: 150).

States Efforts at Mobilization. At the onset of the Civil War, the Federal Government was not prepared and therefore relied on the states for many aspects of the mobilization effort. The North "used the state governments as the medium for recruiting and equipping manpower in the early part of the war" (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955: 83). The states were not only prepared for this task, but in fact were a step ahead of the Federal Government. The nation at the beginning was a collection of individual states. Each state had its own ideals and beliefs and had a different reason for entering into the

War of the Rebellion. "Of the various sections of the North, New England had ever been ready to place her interests above those of the nation" (Shannon, 1928: 16).

Before the war began, the West would "barter her political influence either to the East or the South according to the support for her projects likely to be derived" (Shannon, 1928: 17). The Western states believed strongly in states rights, and this belief did not change during the war. After the Dred Scott case, the attitudes of the West did change. The West feared "that legal slave territory would result in slave settlement and that the legitimate field of expansion for the West would be preempted by the South" (Shannon, 1928: 18). When the war began the West sided with Union, but for its own reasons. The West fought to keep the western territories open for exploration and free from slaves.

Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio had less interest in westward expansion. The motivation of these states stems from tradition. Therefore Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio fought to preserve the tradition of the Union (Shannon, 1928: 18). Despite these different views, when the states banded together to fight the Civil War, the states of the Union became a country in more than name only.

The efforts of the states was very proactive. One day before the fall of Fort Sumter, Wisconsin passed an act that gave the authority to allocate \$100,000 to help in the raising and support of its troops (Huston, 1966: 163). This act was designed to anticipate the President's call to arms (Shannon, 1928: 23). The state of New York followed suit two days later, the same day Lincoln called for troops. New York was faced with emergency conditions of war, but was still able to provide what was needed (Koistinen, 1996: 110). New York granted the use of \$3 million to help support the

30,000 two year troops they were willing to provide to the cause. To provide for the needs of these troops, \$500,000 of the grant was available immediately (Shannon, 1928: 23). In New York, a meeting was held in Union Square to establish the Union Defense Committee. The purpose of the committee was to raise money, supplies, and equip regiments in the early months of the Civil War (Rawley, 1974: 21). The committee was successful and many regions of New York raised large amounts of sum to support the war effort (Nevins, 1959: 88).

Other states followed the movements of Wisconsin and New York with Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey soon joining the cause. Rhode Island appropriated \$500,000 on 17 April for the war effort. Massachusetts passed two acts on 21 May providing a fund of \$10,000,000 to be raised by bonds (Shannon, 1928: 23-24). Most states wanted to send more troops than was requested, and by 10 May 1861, approximately 300,000 men volunteered for service to the Union (Shannon, 1928: 35). By the end of 1861, the Union army numbered around 700,000 men. The early mobilization efforts for the Union was a collection of the individual state's actions with little help from the Federal Government. Many banks, individuals, and businesses donated money to help support the war effort. The Cincinnati City Council donated \$255,000 to help fund the war (Shannon, 1928: 24).

The states asked for the Federal Government to accept more troops than originally asked for. Governor Alexander W. Randall of Wisconsin insisted that the president increase the number of troops. He wrote a letter to Lincoln asking for Lincoln to allow 300,000 more men to "show its [the United States] authority and properly impress the

world” (Shannon, 1928: 35). The governors of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, New Jersey, and many others also requested that more regiments be accepted from the states. Lincoln then issued his request for more troops in a sense to appease the requests of the governors. These new quotas were not difficult to fill. If the Federal Government could have accepted more troops at the time, larger quotas would also have been filled. It was believed that the war would be a short one. Therefore the numbers were low at the beginning until it was ascertained that the war would last longer than three months.

The states were more effective in their recruiting efforts than was the Federal Government. Many reasons account for this fact. The local and state bounties on soldiers were a reason many joined under the state governments. Another reason was the “desire of volunteers to be organized in units with their acquaintances” (Shannon, 1928: 47). According to Shannon, the major reason for the success of the states in recruiting is that the idea of states rights had a firm hold on the minds of both major political parties at the time. “The fact that congress turned over to the states the whole work of recruiting and organization, and this without any voiced opposition, goes to show the hold of the state-rights theory on the popular mind” (Shannon, 1928: 48).

An example of the actions taken by the states is Ohio’s efforts early in the war. Governor Chase of Ohio anticipated the confrontation that was to follow and organized a militia in the 1850s. He formed uniformed and well-equipped companies of militia at major points in the state. On 16 April 1861, the state senate approved \$1 million to assist the Federal Government in the war. This money was divided to provide \$500,000 for the

purchase of any goods the president deemed necessary, \$450,000 to purchase arms and equipment for the militia, and \$50,000 set aside as a contingency fund.

In less than one month, Ohio raised, organized, and fielded an army bigger than the entire United States had three months earlier. Ohio was one of the primary suppliers of troops during the entire war. By the end of 1861, Ohio had provided the following numbers of troops:

Infantry (3 years)	67,546
Cavalry (3 years)	7,270
Artillery (3 years)	3,028
Cavalry (3 month)	22,000
2 Companies (3 month)	180
2 Artillery (3 month)	80
<u>Barnett's Battery (3 month)</u>	<u>120</u>
	100,224

(Reid, 1868: 57)

The states carried the responsibility and burden of mobilization for the majority of the first year of the war. Some generalizations about the first year of the states efforts at mobilization can be drawn according to Koistinen. The first generalization is most states did not work together and acted independently to mobilize the troops. Secondly, despite the fact that the state governors led the mobilization efforts in their respective states, the governors were unable to accomplish the task without the help of the economic elite. The initial mobilization efforts by the states were financed by the banks and the wealthy in the states. Thirdly, the states depended on mass support for many areas of mobilization. The United States Sanitary Commission and the United States Christian Commission aided the states in caring for the sick and wounded and for the families of the soldiers (Koistinen, 1996: 104).

As the war progressed, the states became less involved in the mobilization process. The Federal Government assumed more responsibilities by early in 1862, but the states were still somewhat active in the mobilization effort. Big or small, the states “continued to play an important part in raising and caring for the troops throughout the war” (Koistinen, 1996: 104).

Citizen Involvement. While the call for troops came from the Federal Government, and the Northern governors directed the efforts of the states, many of the early units were formed by citizens. Private citizens organized themselves, at times provided the funding needed. Once they were formed, the units then joined their respective state militia awaiting national orders. The early military units mirrored life of the mid-1800s. The nation at the time of the Civil War was separated into ethnic and social class regions. Small towns would send entire groups in only a few regiments. These people had grown up together and were usually of the same class. Larger towns also sent groups who were sectioned as they were in everyday life. Co-workers would march together. Fire companies would stay as one unit. Other groups included fellow students, neighbors, lifelong friends, and ethnic groups. Some units brought people together from different cultures, but for the most part, men marched in familiar settings (Gallman, 1994: 15-16). While some men had grand pictures of defending the Union at all costs, others joined the service simply out of lack of employment (Shannon, 1928: 39).

Later Mobilization Efforts. As time went on, the Union could not rely completely on volunteers to meet the military requirement. The idea of fighting against the South

was highly glorified at the beginning of the war and because of this, the Union could depend on a constant flow of volunteers. The need for volunteers was intensified as it appeared the militia system was falling apart during the beginning stages of the Civil War. As the war progressed and the newness of the war wore off, "the glory and glamor of 1861 dissolved into the misery and madness of 1862" (Murdock, 1971: 4).

Enlistments in the army slowed by September of 1861. By the winter of 1862-1863 there was little incentive left to enlist. There were many reasons why fewer people enlisted. Two major reasons were the visible cost of human life and the military's inactivity. Another reason was the belief of mismanagement of the troops at the rendezvous points. Many troops found that there was not enough food and supplies and some units were simply turned away (Geary, 1991: 7).

When the new Secretary of War, Edwin McMasters Stanton, was appointed in January 1862, it was believed that the problems in the recruitment would be straightened out. Stanton was effective in his new position. He had strong organizational skills that helped direct the operations of the War Department. Stanton did make one crucial error nonetheless. This mistake was the issuance of General Order 33. This order basically ended further recruiting efforts for the Union army in the North. It is believed that Stanton meant this order to be enacted for a period of only two months. This part of his order was never passed on and he ordered the recruiting personnel to close their offices and return to their military regiments. The soldiers already in the field were in disbelief of the order because they were already undermanned in the field. Stanton was also

criticized at home because of the confusion he caused. Despite what Stanton intended, General Order 33 essentially killed enlistments by a volunteer force (Geary, 7-8).

The subsequent breakdown of volunteerism led to the draft laws initiated in 1862 and 1863. To avoid a draft, the country offered a bounty to anyone who would volunteer. A sum of money, an amount that increased as the war progressed, was given to a man upon his enlistment into the army. This measure "had the expected results--men volunteered--and it became the standard method of obtaining troops" (Murdock, 1971: 5). Many local communities added to the benefits of the bounty system by giving extra items to anyone who volunteered. Some communities made sure that the troops received amenities from home including socks, quilts, and dried fruit. The State of Wisconsin gave soldiers with dependents five extra dollars a month. New Jersey gave an extra six dollars and Vermont gave seven (Geary, 1991: 12-13). Despite these efforts, it became evident the bounty system would not last forever and a draft would be needed to provide the necessary troops to continue the battle with the South.

The draft was unpopular, but precautions were taken to make the draft less offensive. The nation initiated two draft laws: the Militia Act of July 17, 1862 and the Enrollment Act of 1863. The Militia Act "was merely a weapon compelling states to upgrade their militia systems" (Murdock, 1971: 6). Geary states that this act's "main purpose was to enable the Federal Government to order drafting in certain states, but the measure was designed primarily to help guarantee blacks emancipation in exchange for Union service" (Geary, 1991: 22). The Militia Act required the enrollment of all males between eighteen and forty-five who then became eligible for future draft calls by the

male's respective governors. The act also gave Lincoln the authority to call the militia into federal service for a period of no longer than nine months. Additionally the act stated that blacks who entered Union service would receive ten dollars a month compared to the thirteen dollars a month receive by white males (Geary, 1991: 27-28). The Militia Act did not raise the troops that were needed and a more comprehensive system was needed. Thus the Enrollment Act was established in 1863.

There were four presidential calls for troops during the history of the Enrollment Act: the summer of 1863, the spring of 1864, the fall of 1864 and the spring of 1865. The act was conducted by an enrollment board in each congressional district. At this time there were one hundred and eighty-five of these boards. These boards had certain tasks to accomplish. First they had to "compile a list of eligible men in the district between twenty and forty-five years of age" (Murdock, 1971: 8). Many times these lists were inaccurate and these errors led to problems because the lists were the basis for the quota assignments and the names of the draftees were taken from the lists as well. When the president called for troops, each district was given a quota. It became the responsibility of each to district to provide enough men to fill the quotas assigned to it.

The Enrollment Act had some provisions that allowed a person to escape service to the country. If the member drafted paid \$300, he could buy his way out of the service. This commutation clause stayed in effect until July 1864 when it was repealed. Another path of legal evasion allowed the drafted member to find a substitute for him. The draftee paid the substitute the \$300 and did not have to serve in the army (Murdock, 1971). The substitution policy had certain provisions written within. The substitute could not be

liable for the draft himself, the substitute had to continue service in order for the substitution to be valid, and the payment to the substitute only counted for one particular draft call (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955: 112). As the war progressed and after the commutation clause was dissolved, the price to pay a substitute increased. "Though it was an expensive proposition for some, a draftee could still avoid service by furnishing a substitute" (Murdock, 1971: 7). Along with the legal ways to avoid the draft, a draftee could flee to Canada. A few thousand men took this route to escape service. The draft was unpopular by the population as a whole, but something had to be done to provide the men to serve the country.

Overall the draft did not completely succeed. During the Civil War, nearly 2.7 million men served for the Union. Of this number, only six percent were provided by the draft. The best result from the draft was indirect and was mainly a prod to help the Union raise the troops needed. The Union later allowed black troops to join and even used former Confederate troops. By the end of the war, a total of 186,017 Negroes served in the Union Army (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955: 114). The draft did have some positive results, but was for the most part ineffective (Koistinen, 1996: 171-172). Kreidberg and Henry believe the draft "established firmly the principle that every citizen owes the Nation the obligation to defend it and that the Federal Government can impose that obligation directly on the citizen without mediation of the states" (1955: 108-109). The lessons learned from the draft were influential during the drafts for later wars including the two World Wars.

Summary of Mobilization

The Civil War brought changes in the way the nation called forth its men to fight for the country. Before the war began, the standing army of the United States was small. Since the beginning of its history, the nation has downsized the military after every war. By 1861, the Union army was small and additional men were needed to fight the war. President Lincoln called on the militia and volunteers to fight to defend the nation. Almost instantaneously, the states provided the men needed for the war and additionally the states asked to be allowed to submit more men than asked for.

As the war progressed, fewer men volunteered to fight the war. The nation tried different alternatives to raise the troops needed. The first such alternative was the quota system. While this alternative provided troops at the beginning, the war effort required more men. Despite the resentment and ill feeling towards it, the draft came into existence. While not the same as the modern era draft, the draft conducted during the Civil War was the first such act that required men to serve the nation. The draft only provided a small percentage of the men used to fight for the country, but the lessons learned can continue to influence conscription actions for generations to come.

III. Union Supply

Introduction

The nation's actions towards mobilization showed the national support for the war by the states, but this enthusiasm led to a problem. It now became a question of supplying these troops. The Civil War provided the North with a large logistics nightmare. It was a daunting task for a nation with a small military and a relatively small federal bureaucracy to meet the economic and logistical issues presented (Gallman, 1994: 92).

Supply and the Civil War

The logistics of supplying the troops at the beginning of the war was tremendous. The United States had to determine how the country stood in terms of current availability of weapons, food, and clothing. The recent split of the once united nation into two separate countries divided the supplies available. Additionally, the supply system went through turmoil, but attempts were made to adapt and correct these troubles.

The War Department left the responsibility of providing initial equipment, quarters, and transportation to the states, but one person had the unlucky task of organizing the supply system at the Federal Government level. This person was the Quartermaster General, Montgomery C. Meigs. Meigs was a master of efficiency who oversaw the construction of the Washington DC aqueduct. Meigs took over as

quartermaster general in June of 1861. It was his responsibility to bring some semblance of order to the chaotic federal supply system (Gallman, 1994: 92). It became necessary for the Quartermaster and Ordnance departments to supply for a ninefold increase of men (Koistinen, 1996: 134). By the end of his first year as quartermaster general, Meigs had begun to change the way the system was run (Koistinen, 1996: 138).

The States and Supply. At the beginning, the states had the responsibility of supplying the troops with the supplies needed. The state governors took their responsibility and position in the war seriously. The governors responded well to the requests of the Federal Government and went about the business of raising men and money, organizing units, and equipping and dispatching the troops for national service. It was basically the states' responsibility to equip the troops and bill the Federal Government later. The states also took the lead because of their suspicion of a centralized government. This made "integration of the mobilization efforts for the Civil War impracticable until the seriousness of the situation made the necessity clear" (Huston, 1966: 163-164). On 1 July 1861, Secretary Cameron estimated that \$10,000,000 was due to the states for advances given to the troops by the states. In February 1862, an appropriation act set aside an additional \$15,000,000 to pay back the states for the same type of advancements (Shannon, 1928: 54). Both Meigs and Edwin M. Stanton, the Secretary of War after Simon Cameron, assisted the states, and it became their responsibility to bring order to the system later in the war. Their coordinated efforts did bring order to a chaotic system.

Supply Priorities. It was also necessary to decide what exactly needed to be supplied and what the major priorities were going to be. "In addition to arms and ammunition, soldiers needed uniforms, boots, blankets, tents, food, and a bewildering assortment of supplies" (Gallman, 1994: 92). The major items that needed to be supplied to the troops were food, clothing, and weapons. The item that needed the first concern was clothing and individual equipment. The soldiers needed to be clothed before they could fight. The supply of food was not a major concern at the beginning of the war because it was believed there was enough in supply, but it was important nonetheless. "Arms and ammunition might be supplied in more leisurely fashion, but food and clothing, especially food, must be had at once" (Shannon, 1928: 55). Clothing protected the soldier from the elements and food enable the troops to carry on the war effort. The War Department also determined how many items would be necessary to support the soldiers in a successful war. In July of 1861, the War Department estimated the army needed 3,000,000 pairs of shoes and 1,500,000 uniforms a year to properly supply the army's needs (Nevins, 1959: 241).

The Supply of Clothing and Individual Equipment. An immediate concern in supplying an army is the uniform. A soldier must have the proper clothing if he is expected to fight. Finding clothing for the soldiers was not as easy as finding food. At the beginning of the war, there was no large body of companies who were trained to provide the uniforms and especially at the rate in which the army needed the clothing. "Furthermore, the state of the market was such that, in any event, proper materials for soldier's clothing could not be obtained in quantities sufficient to make the private

manufacture of uniforms practicable on a large scale” (Shannon, 1928: 80). Unlike finding food from other sources, the soldier had no secondary sources of supply where they could purchase uniforms, and sometimes the soldiers had to accept poor quality items. Therefore, the soldier had to rely upon what the military had or was available.

At the beginning of the war, the Union had only one depot for clothing. This depot was the Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Schuykill Arsenal was purchased in 1842 by the Quartermaster’s Department when the office of the Commissary General of Purchases was abolished (Risch, 1953: 4). This depot had enough clothing in stock to supply a regular army of about 16,000 men, but not nearly enough to supply the mass amount of volunteers that had signed up to fight the war (Huston, 1966: 183).

In the Summer of 1861, contracts were awarded based on the estimate of a total of 300,000 troops. But when Congress authorized a 500,000 volunteer army on 22 July 1861, something had to be done to alleviate this problem. One action was to enlarge Schuylkill, but this action would take time. Another action was the development of new depots, but again this action did not happen immediately. A new depot was established in New York later in 1861, and in 1862 another one was established in Cincinnati, Ohio. During the war, the Schuylkill depot in Philadelphia purchased more than 948,000 uniform coats and 591,000 jackets. The New York and Cincinnati depots purchased a combined total of 2,985,000 coats during the war (Huston, 1966: 184). Another measure to lessen the burden was to purchase clothing and individual equipment from Europe. This measure was more readily available. These purchases were quite a bit less than the

purchases of weapons from Europe. The total expenditure for textiles and blankets never topped \$380,000 (Huston, 1966: 179).

The combination of the new depots and the foreign purchases provided the nation with what was needed to supply the necessary clothing and equipment to the troops, but other actions occurred during the Civil War. Along with these measures, women volunteers sewed uniforms for the soldiers. Sometimes these women formed in secret (Gallman, 1994: 16). The garments the women made “were often of weird design and workmanship, but the patriotic spirit they displayed more than out weighed any lack of skill” (Shannon, 1928: 86). The women volunteered as soon as the militia was called to support the country. The societies gathered to make uniforms and other accessories they believed to be necessary for the soldiers. “A group of two hundred forty-eight women in Dubuque, Iowa, worked for nine days at the manufacturing of uniforms for two companies, and, from the testimony of the recipients, they amply showed in cut and in fit the evidences of amateur work and haste in construction” (Shannon, 1928: 87). Regardless of the quality, the services provided were appreciated by the nation and the soldiers.

Despite the relief from the volunteers and the added depots, there were still some problems with commonality of uniforms at the beginning of the war. Since the states were required to do the majority of supplying to start the war, different units had different uniforms and this difference led to some confusion on the battlefield that did not subside until later into the war. Three regiments from one state had many different colors: blue, gray, black and white striped, dark blue with green trimmings, and light blue (Shannon,

1928: 90). This mismatch of colors was confusing to many soldiers and caused many problems.

Like the Union Army, the Confederate Army also displayed a collection of mismatched uniforms at the beginning. With both sides garnished in a variety of uniforms, confusion followed. At times it was difficult to tell the difference between someone of your own army and one of the enemy because the uniforms in both armies were similar (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955: 124). "When troops came together on thickly wooded fields the confusion was so great that it was a regular occurrence for Union soldiers to fire on each other" (Shannon, 1928: 93).

The confusion between friend and foe happened so often that orders were issued forbidding uniforms to issued that were not regulation light and dark blue (Shannon, 1928: 93). When new standard uniforms were available, the old mismatched clothing was replaced. These actions did not take place until the war was already well under way, and it was not until the Winter of 1862 when the Union army could technically be called a fully uniformed army (Shannon, 1928: 93-94). The transition took some time, but the Union was able to adjust to changing environment.

The problem of standardization was now solved, but other problems did exist. Some of the uniforms were of poor quality. A large portion of the clothing provided was shoddy. Along with the clothing, the blankets that were issued were of poor quality. At times the blankets were about a third of the size of a regulation blanket, "so rotten that one could poke his finger through them, of such light and open weave as to protect neither against cold nor rain" (Shannon, 1928: 94). The blankets were known to fall

apart without any warning. The quality was so bad that after only a few days of wear, the clothes would fall apart and the soldiers were worse off than they were before. "A Wisconsin regiment, ten days after it had been supplied with bright new uniforms, had to be furnished again with blue overalls, in order that the soldiers might with decency be seen upon the streets" (Shannon, 1928: 95). A soldier is required to fight no matter what he looks like, but a quality uniform means he doesn't die from the elements before he can arrive at the battlefield.

The soldiers of the North were not required to supply their own equipment as much as members of the Confederate Army. Possibly the lone exception to this was the blanket. Blankets were in short supply for the Northern Army. As winter approached, War Department looked like they would be unable to supply the necessary blankets. In response the War Department "was forced to advise volunteers and drafted men to bring with them a good stout woolen blanket apiece, of the regulation military size, eighty-four inches by sixty-six inches, and of five pounds in weight" (Shannon, 1928: 88). At times, the soldiers provided their own equipment by waiting until they reached the rendezvous points or buying them from the sutlers. The prices paid were at times high, but survival was paramount.

The quality of the early supply of shoes was as poor as the quality of other articles of clothes. "The supply of durable, well-fitting shoes was, during the first eighteen months of the war, about as irregular as the supply of clothing" (Shannon, 1928: 96). Shoes were an important part of the uniform, more so than any other pieces of the military uniform. A shoe can indicate the endurance of a soldier. This knowledge left

little impression on the contractors and inspectors. Leather could be imitated and could also be replaced with lower quality material. The result of this poor quality "was that some shoes went to pieces the first day they were worn, while the average life of a pair of contractors' shoes was estimated at from twenty to thirty days" (Shannon, 1928: 97).

Shoes were important, but at times it was better for the soldier to go barefoot. Some the early boots blistered the soldiers' feet so much, many removed them and marched barefooted. The inconvenience of going without shoes and boots was easier to survive than actually wearing the shoes (Shannon, 1928: 98).

There was a variety of prices of supplies for the army during the war. The following illustrates the costs to the United States of specific articles of clothing during the war. The cost of hats ranged from \$1.62 to \$2.18 and caps were anywhere from \$.35 to \$1.04. Trousers cost the United States from \$2.05 to \$5.89. Shirts cost between \$.45 and \$3.01. Shoes and boots ranged from \$1.45 to \$4.83. Overcoats cost between \$6.50 and \$16.11 and rubber ponchos ranged from \$1.87 to \$5.60. The soldier was allotted \$42 a year for clothing. Therefore, "the soldier had to exercise some care, especially during the rigors of marching or battle, if he avoided overdrawing his allowance or buying from the sutler out of his slender monthly wage" (Shannon, 1928: 98-99).

The supply problems for clothing and personal equipment lessened later in war when the draft came into existence. In 1863, the Provost-marshal-general's bureau derived a standard set of requirements to accompany newly drafted men. It was required that the drafted men be given a uniform and supplied with a knapsack, haversack, canteen, and blanket immediately. The soldiers were also supplied a knife, fork, spoon,

tin cup, and tin plate. "Thus, two years after the war had started, for the first time a really efficient and simple method of distribution had been created" (Shannon, 1928: 101-102). This long-needed development finally came about. The unpreparedness of the nation before the war contributed to this delay, and this kind of problem is never an overnight fix.

There were also some benefits which developed during the Civil War in terms of supply. The Civil War served as a rebirth to the Quartermaster system. "In a sense, the modern development of the Quartermaster organization began during the Civil War" (Risch, 1953: 4-5). The problems the Quartermaster system encountered and adjusted to during the course of the Civil War influenced future wars and military activities.

Subsistence Supply. Subsistence provision had the least amount of problems of all the supplies. At the beginning of the war, many local communities provided food to the troops, and in most cases the troops ate better than they did before the war began. Food procurement had some problems after the excitement of mobilization wore off, but compared to the other departments, the Subsistence Department had few. According to Huston, there were few problems in the area of food procurement and overall, the Northern soldiers were well-fed throughout the war. "The fervor of mobilization throughout the North brought all kinds of contributions of food on the part of local communities and organizations, so that for a time many of the soldiers were eating better than they ever had" (Huston, 1966: 184-185).

Shannon's opinion differs from that of Huston. Shannon believes that even though food procurement was less troubled than the other areas of supply, there were

problems nonetheless. "There were plenty of scandals, in the early months of the war, in connection with the letting of beef contracts, but these were soon forgotten in the rush of the later contracts for clothing and munitions" (Shannon, 1928: 76). Shannon agrees with Huston that food was available from the local areas. "The camps of rendezvous in the early period of the war were all relatively small, and so the commanders usually found but little difficulty in furnishing or supplementing the food supply from the immediate neighborhood" (76). Koistinen believes the Union Army was well taken care of in terms of food. He states, "generally, the Union armies were better provisioned than any previous armies in world history" (143). The opinions of these historians agree that early in the war food procurement was not a difficult logistical issue.

The major staple of the army ration of food, which was mandated by law, consisted of salt or fresh beef and either flour or bread. The flour and bread portion generally came in the form of crackers, hard tack, or pilot bread. For the most part, the rations were plain and simple and could be easily moved to the encampments (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955: 123). "The soldier might reasonably complain of the quality of much of his food but he usually got plenty of food of some kind" (Shannon, 1928: 77). The soldier in the field had more difficulty in receiving food, and there were some reports of starvation. For the most part, near the rendezvous points and the training camps, this problem did not occur.

As the war progressed, the general populace became less likely to aid the soldiers. "The first burst of generosity quickly subsided as more and more soldiers appeared, and the novelty of the state of war gave way to grinding monotony" (Shannon,

1928: 78). The populace saw less glory in the war and this transformed to less assistance to the military. The food that the soldiers were receiving was anything but desired. The high concentration of salt in the diet of the soldier was not only undesired, but led to some unhealthy patterns. Eating too much meat rich in salt, and without the proper amount of vegetables, leads to the problem of scurvy. Many governmental and private agencies attempted to rectify this situation later in the war. The Soldier's Aid Societies, in 1862 and 1863, were an example of one of the groups that requested such items as potatoes, onions, cornmeal, dried fruit, and other miscellaneous items of food. All of these efforts had good intentions, but the soldiers still had to find other sources for what they required. Most often this source was either foraging or engaging the sutlers (Shannon, 1928: 79-80). Again high prices were paid for some items, but survival dictated the price paid by the soldier.

The Supply of Weapons. The Union army's problems with weapons stem from the years that preceded the war. After each war or major battle fought in American history, the army was reduced in size. This demobilization occurred because the American people distrusted a strong military based on their experiences in the past, namely with nations such as England. "Most Americans felt that military might was a tool of tyrants and the natural enemy of liberty" (Davis, 1973: 6). Prior to the Civil War, the major military duty was to police the Indian territory. The army needed only to have the ability to expand in the event of major war. Congress had the power to keep the military small in size and expense. Under guidelines in the Constitution, Congress had

the ability to severely limit the military in many aspects (Davis, 1973: 6). Congress used this ability and kept the size of the military to a small level.

Some people believed that this action by Congress would hurt the country in times of war. Former Secretary of the War John C. Calhoun believed that the American nation would be hurt by the limitations set by Congress. In 1820, he warned of these dangers, but little or no attention was paid to his words. Compounded with the nation's success against Mexico, the people of the United States developed a lax attitude. Most people in the country believed that if we were ever confronted again, the state militias could defend the nation. Additionally, "the American successes of the Mexican War tended to confirm the general belief that no large or expensive military establishment need be maintained" (Davis, 1973: 6).

The primary concern of Congress towards the military was money. This concern led to an old system to stock the militia and the regular army with weapons. The standard military small arm was the smoothbore musket. All allotments from the Federal Government to the states were in terms of the value of the old musket. The rifled musket was a much better weapon. Despite the advancement of the rifled musket, the cost was not economically feasible at the time. "Congress thus forced the military to concentrate on economy and efficiency in the decade preceding the Civil War" (Davis, 1973: 8). It now became a priority for the Ordnance Department to consolidate facilities and standardize arms in order to save money.

In 1845, the Ordnance Department adopted the idea of standard weapons. This standardization led the country to stop using private arsenals and use only the national

armories at Harper's Ferry and Springfield, Massachusetts. Standardized weapons had both military and economic advantages. The use of similar types of weapons allowed for simplicity of use and economy of manufacturing. Continuously developing and improving arms led to a problem. This problem was what would be the correct choice of standard weapons. If a standard was set, it was quite possible a new weapon would be developed and the standard could be obsolete (Davis, 1973: 9). In 1855, the new standard for the military in terms of infantry weapons was adopted. The Model 1855 Springfield rifled musket was this new standard (Koistinen, 1996: 99).

In the mid-1850s, the transition began for the rifle to replace the smoothbore musket as the standard weapon in the military. The rifle was a better weapon than the musket because the rifle was more accurate and could be fired from greater distances than the musket. A rifled gun provides a spin to an elongated projectile (the bullet) which gives the object a straight and true flight improving the accuracy and distance. This spin is produced by spiral grooves in the bore of the gun and from the grooves and the process that made the grooves came the name rifle. Without the spin produced by the rifle, the elongated projectiles "would tumble and wobble through space, unpredictable in both course and impact" (Bruce, 1956: 37-38). With the addition of the "minnie ball," the rifle was an outstanding weapon of choice (Weigley, 1967: 190). The rifle was the most advanced weapon of its time.

Despite the improvement provided by the concept of a rifled gun, rifled muskets were the exception and not the rule because of the high costs. Along with the rifle becoming the standard weapon, the ordnance board adopted a standard caliber for the

weapons. The new caliber was the .58-inch which replaced the smoothbore musket caliber .69-inch and the .54-inch caliber of the rifle. The ordnance board decided that carbines and musketoon would no longer be produced. The rifle began to be produced with a detachable stock to fill the gap that was created by the end of musketoon production. These decisions brought the American services closer to a standardized weapon system than ever before. In September of 1855, Colonel Henry Knox Craig, the Chief of Ordnance at this time, "announced that the armories had ceased fabricating all but the .58 caliber arms" (Davis, 1973: 10). Additionally, before the war began, the Federal Government dropped "the plans to manufacture breech-loading rifles using metallic rim cartridges" (Green, et al., 1955: 18). By stopping this production, the government was manufacturing obsolete weapons when compared to the higher quality weapons being produced in Europe.

In the decades prior to the start of the Civil War, the Ordnance Department reshaped itself. By 1840, the Ordnance Department no longer allowed large subsidized contracts with private firms who manufactured infantry muskets. At this time the Springfield and Harper's Ferry arsenals were large enough to provide for the army's immediate needs. This action by the Ordnance Department led to the dissolution or reorganization of all the private arms dealers in the United States. These companies could not survive without the help of the Federal Government. A new private arms industry was formed in the 1830s and by the time the Civil War began, was an advanced industry. This industry primarily sold weapons to the civilian market, but the weapons were not interchangeable between the civilian companies who purchased the weapons

(Koistinen, 1996: 158-159). These developments led to problems later in the war when the Ordnance Department purchased the weapons from these companies.

The Ordnance Department made many tests of the new arms and attempted to increase the number of arms in service. Colonel Craig warned that the nation needed more weapons on hand. In 1857, he said that the nation needed at least 1 million rifles and muskets in reserve. Congress did not agree with this assessment and the requested increase was not approved. Congress additionally had plans to reduce the number of arsenals and depots within the military system. It was concluded that the number of arsenals be reduced to four. Each of these arsenals would serve one portion of the country (Davis, 1973: 11).

As of November 1859, Craig reported the following numbers of weapons in stock:

Smoothbore Muskets

Altered to percussion, cal. .69	275,744
Altered to Maynard lock, cal. .69	14,765
<u>Made as percussion, cal. .69</u>	<u>213,155</u>
	503,664

Rifled Muskets

Percussion, since rifled, cal. .69	33,631
<u>Rifled muskets, cal. .58</u>	<u>24,105</u>
	57,736

Rifles

Altered to percussion, cal. .54	1,385
Made as percussion, cal. .54	43,375
<u>New Model rifle, cal. .58</u>	<u>4,102</u>
	48,862

(Note: The number of first class arms, .58 cal rifles and rifled muskets, was only 28,207 out of 610,598 of the shoulder arms. Fifty percent of the shoulder arms, 333,133, were produced since 1842.) (Davis, 1973: 39)

According to Davis, at the beginning of the Civil War, the United States Army was well armed with the weapons presented above. The army was well stocked until the added numbers of personnel that the war would add were included. There were not enough weapons for a volunteer force of any size (Davis, 1973: 39). According to Bruce, the Union had enough old-fashioned smoothbore muskets to equip the envisioned army of 250,000 at the beginning of the war. This was a conservative estimate (Bruce, 1956: 37). By January of 1861, the number of .58 caliber arms increased to 35,335. Despite this increase, the federal reserve of shoulder arms decreased to 576,800. This loss was due to the quota issued to the states and sales of arms to private arms dealers and to the states. The states received 11,399 long arms from quota issues and 31,610 of the .69 caliber smoothbore muskets were sold to the arms dealers and states.

Craig was not happy with the decline of the arms reserve, but at the time there was little to worry about. The War Department planned to phase out the older muskets, rifles, and rifled muskets and replace them with the standard .58 caliber weapons. Therefore, ridding the reserves of supposedly obsolete weapons raised little concern. The secession crisis and the beginning the war changed the belief that the loss of the supposedly obsolete weapons would do no damage to the war effort (Davis, 1973: 39-40).

By the beginning of the war, the Ordnance Bureau listed a total of 437,433 rifles and muskets and a total of 4,076 carbines. Around 40,000 of these weapons were the new 1855 rifles and rifled muskets. A majority of the 1855 rifles, between thirteen and

fifteen thousand, were stored at Harper's Ferry Armory. Events later in the war would make it necessary to search for weapons elsewhere (Davis, 1928: 41). Approximately 60,000 of the American weapons were in the Far West and therefore not easily accessible (Koistinen, 1996: 160). Additionally, nearly half of the available weapons were of poor quality and at times unable to be used properly by the soldiers (Nevins, 1959: 343). The nation could not survive with the amount of weapons on hand and therefore the nation had to go elsewhere to subsidize the deficit supply.

When the Civil War began, weapon procurement was a problem and remained so throughout the war. The early volunteers were supplied weapons by the states. The first volunteers to offer their services were rewarded with the best weapons that the states could provide. "The first regiments into service, drawing on the good arms immediately available, would be better armed than those to follow during the first two years of war" (Davis, 1973: 42). It was not long until the states ran out of stock and the burden fell to the nation and the Ordnance Department. The states hoped that the Federal Government would be able to provide the necessary first class weapons to the troops later in the war (Davis, 1973: 41-42). The national effort to raise the required weapons for the nation entering the war was hampered by two significant events, the destruction of Harper's Ferry and the Ordnance Department itself.

Before the Civil War began, there were two main armories in the United States, Harper's Ferry, Virginia and Springfield, Massachusetts. When the armory at Harper's Ferry was destroyed to ensure the facility would not fall into enemy hands, Springfield was the only one left. Most of the rifles stored at Harper's Ferry were destroyed in the

fire that resulted from the destruction of the armory. Luckily the majority of the 1855 rifled muskets were stored in the Springfield armory. The majority of the first-class .58 caliber arms stayed in the hands of the Union despite the seizure by the Confederates of the United States arsenals. The Southern government could claim only approximately 20,000 rifled guns of any type. The Union, on the other hand, could claim roughly 100,000 rifles of all types (Davis, 1973: 41). This was a strong advantage.

There were adequate weapons to support the regular army, but not nearly enough to support the amount of volunteers that would soon need weapons. In addition, there was not an adequate supply of first-class weapons. The burden of manufacturing fell upon the Springfield armory due to the destruction of the armory at Harper's Ferry. This was a tremendous burden on this lone armory. Springfield employed about 3,000 men and the production of weapons increased during the first year, but the production numbers were not enough to support the troops. At the beginning of the war, Springfield's capacity was only 1,200 rifles per month. Despite the action taken, it became apparent that the immediate demands of the war were not going to be met and this led to the Union looking elsewhere for other sources of weapons (Huston, 1966: 178). The nation had to purchase weapons from contractors to sustain the war effort and between 12 August 1861 and 10 January 1862, the Union contracted for a total of almost 2 million muskets and rifles (Meneely, 1928: 253).

The Ordnance Department itself was a problem and this problem hindered the weapon procurement process. The Ordnance Department, led by Lieutenant Colonel James Wolfe Ripley at the beginning of the war, was one of the worst-prepared

departments when the war began. The Ordnance Department was too small at the beginning of the war to handle the needs of a large army. "While the rest of the United States Army grew rapidly, the Ordnance Department, like other service departments, remained almost static in the size of the officer corps for the first two years of the war" (Davis, 1973: 15).

Many of the complaints about the Ordnance Department were accurate, but the jobs assigned to the people of the Department were difficult. The tasks of those involved were nearly impossible considering the resources they had to work with from years of poor management of the system. Along with the political red tape and the shortage of personnel, the Ordnance Department had many problems. The department had the gigantic task of arming troops and upgrading their arms. Despite the problems encountered, the Ordnance Department completed this task. "This in itself was a considerable accomplishment" (Davis, 1973: 37). By 1862, the Ordnance Department was accomplishing astonishing feats, but it was still judged by the early problems of the war. The bad reputation the department earned in 1861 carried with it throughout the Civil War (Koistinen, 1996: 160). First impressions are lasting and at times are hard to overcome no matter what is attempted to polish one's image.

The Ordnance Department was slow, at the beginning of the war, to purchase additional weapons from European sources. Many Americans resented the idea of procuring weapons from Europe and believed that the United States could provide all that was necessary. Before the Civil War, the United States did purchase weapons from Europe at times. A large portion of the weapons used by the United States against Great

Britain during the Revolutionary War was from France (Green, et al., 1955: 14). Despite the earlier purchases from overseas, the nation was still apprehensive to purchase foreign made weapons.

At the onset of the hostilities, Ripley proposed the idea of buying 100,000 arms from Europe to supplement the current stock and the weapons being produced at the through domestic sources. Secretary of War Cameron did not agree. He believed that the Union already had enough troops to fight the war against the South. Furthermore, he believed that if any weapon was going to be purchased, it would be done domestically (Bruce, 1956: 42-43). This belief held true until it looked like the Civil War would be much longer than originally anticipated. When Congress approved a 500,000 volunteer army, it became necessary to contact Europe for supplies that could not be provided domestically. Along with this event, by May of 1861, all rifled muskets had been distributed to the soldiers. The policy of the Ordnance Bureau's policy was to give the better rifled muskets to the three-year volunteers. Even with this regulation, "all of the rifled muskets had disappeared by May" (Davis, 1973: 42). After the .58 caliber weapons were distributed, the Federal Government then issued the .69 caliber rifled muskets. By the end of May, the best the Ordnance Department could do was to give the soldiers unaltered smoothbore muskets. Only 3,354 of these were in good enough condition to be used and 22,776 were rifled, but had no sights. "By early summer of 1861, rifled arms of American manufacture virtually had disappeared from Federal arsenals" (Davis, 1973: 43). The shortage of first-class weapons before the war began to haunt the nation and other sources were needed.

Before looking abroad, the Union exhausted American sources for weapons. The government purchased nearly anything, including Colt pistols, sporting rifles, and surplus condemned arms. Regardless of the weapon procured, the costs were at a premium. The commercial market made a killing on the sales of weapons to the Union due to the fact the Union needed the weapons almost instantly. "Even so, the domestic market yielded only about thirty thousand rifles and muskets during the first fourteen months of the war" (Davis, 1973: 47).

Many arms makers could not resist the opportunity to make a profit from the Federal Government's purchase of weapons. Colt charged \$25 for his pistol at the same time Remington charged only \$15 for a pistol that was practically the same in every way. This was too much of a difference for a comparable weapon. P. S. Justice also took advantage of the situation. Justice imported weapons and sold them to the Federal Government, but this way of doing business turned out to be unprofitable. He then began to manufacture rifled muskets and rifles. In August of 1861, Justice agreed to produce weapons for the Federal Government. His weapons were not first class, but he still charged the Federal Government \$18 per rifle. Justice delivered .69 caliber rifled muskets and .58 caliber rifles. The weapons were produced from a variety of parts that were just fitted together to complete the weapons. Many of the parts used were condemned, but were nonetheless used. The weapons were so bad that many were recalled from the field and had to be replaced. His rifles passed inspection, but still failed in the field or under realistic conditions. This problem shed a poor light on the inspection process. Were these arms a fraud against the Federal Government or were they products

of an inexperienced manufacturer? "Whatever the case, the government, in its haste, had purchased poor quality arms at prices far above their actual value" (Davis, 1972: 50).

The Department of the West under Fremont was notorious for the giving extra profit to the arms dealers. Fremont was known to buy a Hall carbine for \$22.50 when the price on the street was \$17.50. The \$17.50 was the price for new weapons, but those purchased by Fremont were second hand and at times condemned. Colt revolvers were worth only about \$15. These weapons sold by contract for \$25, but Fremont paid \$35 per weapon. This was a common form of abuse during arms purchases (Shannon, 1965: 119-129). Nearly all areas of supply and operations under Fremont, including transportation contracts and purchases of horses or mules, was "subject to favoritism, bribery, kickbacks, profiteering, and misuse of government funds" (Koistinen, 1996: 135).

The United States exhausted the home market for arms early into the war. By early summer of 1861, it became necessary to look overseas for the weapons. Many of the early weapons purchased from Europe were of very poor quality, and at times, the weapons were unserviceable. Initially, the foreign purchases were conducted without any centralized direction (Koistinen, 1996: 162). People were appointed to conduct the foreign purchase, but for the most part, the early purchases were conducted in haste. Another problem was that the states and private arms dealers had agents in Europe contracting for the same weapons the Federal Government wanted. Because of this increased competition for the same goods, the prices of the weapons increased (Davis, 1973: 52-53).

The War Department appointed Colonel George L. Schuyler to conduct weapons purchases in Europe. Schuyler was authorized to purchase 100,000 rifled muskets, 20,000 cavalry sabers, 10,000 revolvers, and 10,000 carbines. He also had "complete discretionary powers as to the prices to be paid" (Shannon, 1928: 117). Schuyler actually purchased 126,661 rifles, rifled muskets, and carbines. He also bought 10,000 revolvers and 21,850 sabers. Schuyler was disappointed that he was unable to purchase as many British Enfields. This was the weapon of choice from Europe and was considered a first class weapon. He was able to buy roughly 15,000 Enfields, but many more were desired (Davis, 1973: 54-56). The revolver purchased by Schuyler was the French Lefauchaux. These weapons were accurate and powerful and could be loaded more rapidly than any American percussion revolver.

During the first 15 months of the war, the Federal Government purchased approximately 738,000 muskets, rifles, and carbines from the European markets (Huston, 1966: 178-179). During the entire Civil War, the Union purchased approximately 1,165,000 European rifles and muskets. The majority of these purchases occurred in the first two years of the war (Davis, 1973: 64). Cameron made an extreme mistake by not purchasing from Europe sooner. If he had acted earlier, the Union would have had fewer problems. Along with this fact, the Union would have stopped the South from purchasing weapons from the same sources by pursuing a stronger stance in European purchases. For more than three precious months Simon Cameron held in check the tremendous power of the United States Government to pre-empt the European arms market and forestall the arming of the Confederacy. That delay was one of the costliest

blunders of the war---“which is saying a great deal” (Bruce, 1956: 43). Davis contends that “the delays in financing by the Treasury Department lost the Union advantage in securing ready-made Enfields and a chance to contract for most of the future production of them over and above the demands of the British government” (Davis, 1973: 56).

Meneely agrees that the United States should have used the resources of Europe earlier in the war. “Had the government at the start gained control, or nearly so, of European arms markets, the plight of the Confederacy would have been extremely serious” (1929: 280).

The quality of the European weapons was considered to be relatively inferior, especially during the early stages of the war. Nearly all of the smoothbore muskets purchased from Europe came into the United States during the first few months of the war. The European governments and arms dealers sold the worst available arms first. The United States was desperate for weapons, and therefore, the environment was right for European dealers, who used the American desperation to their advantage early on. Because of the meager weapons sent to the United States, the European weapons were deemed bad and this reputation lasted throughout the war (Davis, 1973: 64-65). Despite the problems that occurred with foreign weapons, many American soldiers used arms manufactured in Europe. “More than half of the Union regiments that went into battle before the fall of 1862 were armed with foreign rifles and muskets” (Bruce, 1956: 50). The European weapons helped the Union during a time when domestic weapons were hard to come by and sustained the military effort until the Union could produce more of its own weapons.

The purchase of weapons at different locations helped elevate the supply problem somewhat, but it brought about another problem. This problem was simply that by buying weapons from different suppliers, the army was giving its soldiers different types of weapons. This defeated the standardization efforts in the years previous to the war. The guns purchased in the United States were different than those from Europe. This non-correlation of weapons led to not only an early problem, but one that would last throughout the war. The different weapons caused a conflict in standardization which led to problems in the repair of the weapons, a problem with the supply of spare parts for the weapons, and problems of coordination and supply of ammunition. Weapon procurement was a problem that never really was solved and was something the army had to deal with until the end of the war (Huston, 1966: 185).

Shannon presents an example of the variety of weapons by troops from the same state. "Iowa troops in the first year of the war were equipped with Austrian muskets, Prussian muskets, Belgian rifles, Harper's Ferry muskets, Spencer's carbines, Sharp's carbines, Colt's revolvers, navy revolvers, Whitworth rifles, Colt's revolving rifles, Minie rifles, besides some of the other varieties of less known weapons" (Shannon, 1956: 125). Needless to say this problem caused much confusion and a logistical headache.

The foreign weapons had a wide range of caliber which created many problems for the ordnance officers. One type of British rifle had .44 caliber. On the other extreme, The Austrian and Belgian smoothbores were .79 caliber. The variety of weapons required twenty-five different cartridges to supply them properly. Additionally, the supply of spare parts was nearly non-existent. When a sight became damaged, it was required to

replace the whole sight assembly because there were no replacement sights.

Cannibalization became an often-used practice. At times the Ordnance Department had to use as many as two or three damaged weapons to make one functional arm. As the arms shortage lessened, the practice of cannibalization decreased, “but this was a luxury which the Union could not afford in the early days of the war” (Davis, 1973: 66). As the war progressed, the quality of the European weapons increased. This increase in quality occurred until foreign purchases were discontinued during the summer of 1863. The Ordnance then replaced all but the best European weapons with the standard Springfield rifle (Koistinen, 1996: 163).

Artillery was easier to provide during the Civil War than small arms. The army was issued only 7,892 cannon during the years of 1861 and 1866. Over this same time period, the army was issued over 4,000,000 small arms. “The Civil War was primarily an infantryman’s war, and, though the artillery played an important part, especially in siege operations, the question of supply was never acute” (Shannon, 1956: 126).

Scandal and the Supply System

During the initial stages of the Civil War, there were many instances of scandal. The nation was in such a hurry to fight the war that many of the rules and regulations were ignored. This neglect of the rules led to corruption and at times graft. “Where so large an amount of purchasing and contracting was being done by a variety of agencies, under pressure, and with rules and regulations suspended to a varying degree, it was inevitable that graft, fraud and inadvisable transactions should occur” (Meneely, 1929:

258). Many profiteers and unethical traders and business men took advantage of the loose enforcement of rules and regulations and turned the process of supplying the troops into a money-making venture. At times these profiteers made outrageous profits and additionally, manufacturers received excessive prices for items that were sold to the Union.

The middleman was also involved in excess profits. By empty promises or selling to other middlemen, some unethical men made large profits (Huston, 1966: 180). The Union was paying almost double the value for some items. Costs were high and quality, at times, seemed too low. "Through haste, carelessness, or criminal collusion, the state and federal officers accepted almost every offer and paid almost any price for the commodities, regardless of character, quality, or quantity" (Shannon, 1928: 55).

Much of the early money spent went to make a few contractors rich and made some rich even richer. Some contractors signed contract at extremely high prices and then turned around and sold these contracts to sub-contractors at a greatly reduced rate. "It is a notorious fact that many of the greatest fortunes of today had their origin in Civil War contracts" (Shannon, 1928: 56). The fraud and graft that occurred was not exclusive to only this war in the history of American procurement. In other periods of American history, profiteers used wars to take advantage and make money. The Civil War did provide a period of an abundance of graft and new laws to curb the unlawful practices.

The abuse of the system was so abundant that an extra session of Congress was held in 1861 to investigate the existing practices and conditions. By a motion from New York Congressman Charles H. Van Wyck, a special committee was appointed to

investigate the abuse on 8 July 1861. This committee meet until 10 July 1862. "The committee discovered an astounding amount of illegal and fraudulent activities, in some instances calling into question the honor and judgment of men high in the political and military councils of the country" (Shannon, 1928: 58).

One example cited by Shannon recalls an instance of fraud. In this case, the Department of the West purchased 5,000 Hall carbines from Simon Stevens of Pennsylvania. In June of the same year, the Ordnance bureau of the War Department sold these same guns to Arthur M. Eastman of Manchester, New Hampshire. The bureau sold these weapons for \$3.50 each. Eastman altered the guns for about \$.75 to \$1.25 each and then sold them to Stevens at a rate of \$12.50 each. Stevens then turned around and sold them to the Department of the West at a cost of \$22 per gun (Shannon, 1928: 59).

The committee found many things wrong with this transaction. The committee also found that the War Department should not have sold the weapons in the first place when they were buying "worthless Austrian muskets at \$6.50 each" (Shannon, 1928: 59). The second problem with this transaction was that there is no reason why the Federal Government should have bought these weapons back only a few weeks after they were sold and for six times the price they sold them. Another strange aspect of this story is that 790 of these guns were condemned and sold by the War Department for a low price. In April of 1861, an agent of the War Department bought back these weapons for \$15 each and two months later the weapons were sold to Eastman (Shannon, 1928: 59). These practices were present in many other purchases of supplies and extended to other areas in the Federal Government as well.

Order to the System

Scandal in the supply system continued to occur throughout the first year of the war. It was not until 1862 that some sort of reform began to take place. The congressional investigating committee made their reports public on 18 December 1861. Their reports confirmed earlier reports of corrupt actions. Another step toward reform occurred when Stanton was named the Secretary of War on 20 January 1862. Stanton proved to be an effective person in this important position. Congress as a whole began to take a hard stance towards the abuse in the system. Acts were approved on 17 July 1862 to curb the abuse. "Besides a number of provisions calculated to make bidding open and competitive and contracts ironclad and written, there were clauses designed to check the graver abuses of fraud and corruption" (Shannon, 1928: 74). The Federal Government aided in elevating the problems by standardizing contracts and revamping the inspection system (Nevins, 1959: 350). These acts did not end the corruption, but they were the first steps required to stop the abuse of the Federal Government system.

By the winter of 1861-1862, Meigs and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton were able to bring some order to the chaotic contracting and supply system of the Federal Government. There were now three main supply depots: Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and New York. Federal agents procured raw materials that would produce the needed uniforms at each of these depots. The work that could not be conducted here was contracted out to private business and industry (Gallman, 1994: 92-93).

Providing supplies to the troops became less problematic later in the war. The problem became less when the draft came into existence. When the Provost-marshal-general's bureau derived a standard set of requirements to accompany newly drafted men later in 1863, each soldier was issued standard supplies (Shannon, 1928: 102-103). As the war progressed, the Federal Government's use of private industry and foreign markets helped with the supply of most items. From guns to clothing, the soldiers were able to receive more later in the war than they did at the beginning.

When Harper's Ferry was destroyed, the Springfield armory served as the only source for arms. A new armory was built in Rock Island, Illinois, to elevate this burden. By the end of the Civil War, the Springfield Arsenal increased production. When the war began, Springfield produced rifles at a pace of 12,000 a year. By 1864, Springfield reached its capacity of 300,000. In 1865, Springfield was the largest arsenal in the world in terms of output and size (Koistinen, 1996: 163). The nation searched out other means to provide what was needed and the Union's supply system developed into one that was a mixture of federal manufacturing and private contracting. Despite the profiteering that occurred early in the war, the system became a framework for years to come. "In the closing months of the war the reports declared that there were no longer many complaints received of defective material or workmanship...The continued presence of fraud was admitted, but, with the rigid care that was being exercised it was felt that, in amount, it was being held to a minimum" (Shannon, 1928: 103).

Summary of Supply

When the Civil War began, the North had an uphill battle to fight in terms of supply. The years preceding the war found the United States reducing the active military force. This reduction was followed by a reduction in the supplies provided to the troops. The common belief at the time was the military was not very important and did not require much money to support its operations. The military had a standard weapon for the men in the Army, but a limited budget did not allow the necessary procurement of arms needed. Constant reductions transformed the military into an ineffective fighting force.

The fall of Fort Sumter found the nation needing in supplies for the incoming recruits and volunteers. The Union army needed weapons, clothing, and subsistence support and since the on-hand supply was deficit, it became necessary to go elsewhere for what was needed. The Union sought supplies from domestic sources first, but when the need for more supplies existed, traveled to Europe to procure the needed supplies.

The urgency of the military and Federal Government beget fraud and corruption by unethical businessmen. The United States paid outrageous prices for many goods and services during the beginning of the Civil War. These foul practices ended later in the war when Congress enacted measures to reduce such actions. The supply system for the United States transformed from a system of mild inactivity to a system of chaos and confusion to a system which became the model for future generations. The Civil War was a difficult time, but the lessons learned will last and endure and help for future encounters.

IV. Findings and Conclusions

Introduction

The main thrust of this thesis was to study the logistics of the Union Army during the initial stages of the Civil War. The way in which the United States conducted mobilization and supply activities changed during the course of the four years of war. In the two previous chapters of this thesis, information was presented about the actions undertaken by the Union to mobilize and supply its troops during the beginning of the Civil War. In this chapter, the information previously presented is used to answer the investigative questions presented in the initial chapter of this thesis. The facts and details are extracted from the sources cited in the two previous chapters. Additionally this chapter serves as the conclusion to this thesis' research.

Answers to Investigative Questions

Research Question 1. Prior to the Civil War, how prepared was the Union Army to fight a war? How were the logistical objectives of the military met?

In the most general terms, the Union Army was not prepared to fight a war. The Civil War divided a once whole nation and this division split the resources available to sustain a war fighting effort. After the victory against Mexico in 1848, the nation demobilized to pre-war levels. Unlike any time previous, the United States spread out from the Atlantic to Pacific Ocean. The active duty military was small, a little over

10,000 men, and was widely disseminated. The Civil War required far more men to fight the war than were active at the time. Additionally, the logistics system of the Union was poor and inadequate to fight a war on the scale of the Civil War. The nation had to make many adjustments to become properly prepared.

One advantage the North had over its opponents in the South its size. The Union had a much larger population and had more men of fighting age than did the Confederates. Along with having the advantage of manpower, the North was more industrialized than the South. The Union had more railroads, manufacturing plants, and a more advanced financial network. These advantages are best during a long war and the Civil War turned into such a war. Therefore, the North's decidedly obvious advantages enabled the North to endure the early defeats and win the war.

Coinciding with a relatively small military, the North's supply system was in poor condition at the start of the war. Congress kept the available supplies to a minimum. The number of supplies was intended to sustain the small active duty force and not a war fighting nation. The commonly held belief was the militia would be adequate to deter any enemy insurgence and because of this, Congress held back on supplies. Many people, including Secretary of War Calhoun, warned of shortages, but these words fell upon deaf ears. The actions by Congress meant that when the war started, the Union was seriously hindered by a lack of supplies. It took time for the nation to acquire adequate supplies for its armed forces.

At the start of the war, there was a serious shortage of arms. For years the rifle was known to be a far superior weapon than was the musket. Despite this knowledge, the

rifle did not become the standard arm for the military until the 1850s. The main reason for this delay was money. Congress did not believe the cost to upgrade to the rifle was a necessity. The rifle did become the standard weapon, but the higher cost of the rifle when compared to the musket, slowed the full integration of the rifle as the primary weapon in the military. The nation would have been at a considerable disadvantage had its enemies had the more advanced weapon. In this particular case, the South was in the same situation because the nations had been one country during the time period of the standardization of weapons in the mid-1850s. Nevertheless, the reluctance and shortsightedness of the leaders of the nation, and of the Congressmen in particular, delayed the acquisition of a superior and more effective weapon.

Before the war began, the Union army's logistics system was in disarray, and for all practical purposes was non-existent. The army was spread out across the nation and the number of active members was small. The dispersal of the military and the low quantities of supply available equaled a logistics system not prepared for war. This in turn led to a nation not ready to enter into a war. Much effort was required to transform the existing military into one capable to fight their neighbors to the south. From mobilization to supply, the nation had to adapt to the environment thrust upon it. This adaptation took time, but was nevertheless accomplished.

Research Question 2. **Were the early attempts of mobilizing the Union Army successful? How were they performed? If these attempts were unsuccessful, how were they changed to meet demand?**

For the most part, the early attempts of the Union in mobilizing an army were successful, but as the war continued, different actions were needed to recruit men. One day after the surrender of Fort Sumter, President Lincoln called for 75,000 men to serve in the United States Army. These troops were called into service for a period of only three months. The amount of time that the soldiers were called upon was based on the restrictions imposed on recruitment established by the Militia Acts of 1795 and 1803. Additionally, the men were asked to serve for only three months because of the belief the war between the states would be short. The Union later learned that the nation would need many more men to fight the war, but when the war began, the number called upon was believed to be sufficient.

When the war began, the Federal Government was not adequately prepared to mobilize the soldiers alone. Because of this deficiency on the part of the Federal Government, the major responsibility for recruitment and mobilization fell to the states. Additionally the fear of a strong Federal Government impelled the states to take a lead in the mobilization effort. As with their former countrymen in the South, the Northern states feared a strong Federal Government would undermine the rights of the states. All of the above pointed to the states as the best choice to mobilize the nation.

The states responded to Lincoln's call for men with all haste. The majority of states provided the necessary men and requested to send more for the war effort. By the

end of the first month of the recruitment, the states provided over 300,000 volunteers to fight against the South. By the end of the first year, the Union Army consisted of over 700,000 men. In the most general terms, the Union had relatively no problem recruiting the necessary volunteers at the beginning of the war, but as the realities of war set in, the abundance of men soon subsided and the nation had to find other ways of acquiring the needed soldiers.

With the defeat of the Union Army after the First Battle of Bull Run in July of 1861, the nation realized the war would not be over in a matter of days. This battle served as a wake-up call to the soldiers and those responsible for gathering the troops for battle. The first action taken to ensure the nation would have the necessary soldiers to fight the war was an action by Congress in July of 1862. This action, the Militia Act of 1862, gave the President the power to indenture the services of the volunteers for a much longer period of time. Lincoln was no longer bound by the earlier Militia Acts and could hold a soldier for longer than three months. The act by Congress was a sure indication the war would not be quick or easy.

By the end of the first year of the war, the number of men volunteering became less and less. The incentive to become involved in a long and drawn out war was less appealing and when General Order 33 was enacted, the number of volunteers was near zero. Two systems were devised later in the war when the volunteer system was no longer effective. These two systems were the bounty system and the draft.

The first system used was the bounty system. Any soldier who volunteered to fight for the Union was given a one time monetary bonus. The amount of this bonus

depended on the respective state involved in the recruitment of men. As the war progressed, the amount paid to a volunteer increased. The reason the dollar amount increased was the war became less and less desirable and in order to meet the quotas set upon the states, larger bounties were required to attract volunteers. In addition to money, some states added other bonuses including blankets and fruit. Each state did what it could in order to meet the quota given it by the Federal Government.

The next system after the bounty system became ineffective was a draft. The United States had two draft laws during the Civil War. The first, the Militia Act of 1862, was far from effective because it was not comprehensive enough. Therefore a more effective law was in order and this act was the Enrollment Act of 1863. Unlike the early draft law, the Enrollment Act was comprehensive and gave more power to acquire the needed soldiers. Between the years of 1863 and 1865, the United States had four different calls for troops which fell under the Enrollment Act. Each Congressional district was responsible for registering the men between the age of twenty and forty-five and also had the responsibility of ensuring the quotas assigned them were filled.

The Enrollment Act was effective in acquiring the men needed for the war, but contained within the act were provisions that allowed men to avoid service. A man had three options if he did not desire to serve the nation. First he could pay \$300 and legally avoid service. Second, he could find a substitute for himself and pay the substitute the \$300. This option, like the first, was legal. A third option was to flee to Canada to avoid service. Although this option was not legal, over 1,000 men fled to Canada.

The mobilization and recruitment of men changed throughout the war. At the beginning of the war, enough men volunteered to serve the nation. As the war progressed, fewer and fewer men volunteered and other ways to recruit men were needed. The Union adapted to these conditions and found new and semi-effective ways of mobilizing men to fight the Civil War. The new systems, the bounty system and the draft, only provided a small proportion of the men who fought for the Union and were therefore only partially effective efforts to mobilize the soldiers needed. Overall, the majority of the troops who served for the Union were volunteers. Approximately 94% of the soldiers who served came from the volunteer force. The early mobilization of the troops was successful mainly because of the patriotic nature of the American citizens.

Research Question 3. Were the early attempts of supplying the Union Army successful? Who were the primary suppliers of the military forces? How did these attempts change during the first year of the war?

The large inflow of new men into the armed forces created a logistical nightmare in terms of supply. The new soldiers who entered the army needed weapons, clothing, personal equipment, and subsistence in order to be prepared for the war and to survive the environment. As with the effort to mobilize the Union Army, the Federal Government was not prepared to be the sole provider of supply for the troops at the beginning of the war. Therefore the majority of the early efforts of supply were conducted by the states. The Federal Government did assume some of the responsibility of providing supplies and reimbursed the states for the money spent in the states efforts. As with mobilization, the

Federal Government assumed more responsibility for the supply of the troops later in the war. Overall the Union attempts at supplying the army at the beginning of the war were unsuccessful and because of this, new sources of supply became necessary to properly supply the soldiers.

At the beginning of the war, clothing and personal equipment were given priority over weapons and food. The soldiers required clothing to be properly outfitted as an army and to survive the environmental conditions of war. There were many problems in terms of the supply of clothing at the beginning of the war. The first problem was the fact that the United States Army had only one depot for clothing. This depot was the Schuylkill Arsenal in Pennsylvania. The Schuylkill Arsenal was able to supply enough clothing for the active duty soldiers, but not for the new recruits. To solve this problem, the Federal Government enlarged the depot, developed new depots, and purchased clothing from European markets.

Another problem with the clothing provided to the soldiers was the different styles issued to the troops. In some instances soldiers in the same unit wore a variety of uniforms. Confusion often ensued because of the differences and at times a soldier could not judge if another man was a member of the Union or a Confederate soldier. Luckily the confusion later subsided when the uniform of a Union soldier had to be a standard light or dark blue.

A third problem with the early uniforms was the quality. In the most basic terms, the uniforms were of poor quality and oftentimes included clothing that fell apart. The uniforms, shoes, and blankets during the war had a tendency to fall apart and become

brittle. Some the blankets issued to the soldiers were so full of holes that they did not provide any relief from the elements. Additionally, many soldiers choose to not wear the boots issued and instead went barefooted. The boots caused more problems than they were worth. The soldiers were able to march longer without the boots because of the damaged caused to the feet by the boots.

As the war went on, the problems encountered with the clothing subsided. About two years into the war, each new recruit was given more and better supplies before he went into the field. The quality of the manufactured articles also improved. The uniforms were more standard and did not fall apart as easily as before.

The supply of food was not as problematic as for clothing or weapons. At the beginning of the war, many local citizens provided food to the troops. The general populace was caught up in the pageantry of the war at the beginning and believed in doing all they could to make sure the soldiers were well feed. Later in the war, this support by the public decreased and so did the food given to the army by the populace.

The area of supply that underwent the most dramatic changes is weapon procurement. In the decades preceding the Civil War, the United States established the rifle as the standard weapon. Despite this standardization, the army was not armed with only the rifle. The old musket was still in use in the military mainly for monetary reasons. The rifle cost more than did the musket and even though the rifle was the standard weapon, Congress did not purchase enough rifles to outfit the army. Additionally, before the war began, Congress wanted to reduce the number of armories. A reduction of armories and a low amount of first class weapons equaled a troubling

problem at the commencement of the Civil War. When the armory at Harper's Ferry was destroyed, the supply of weapons for the military was in trouble.

The addition of the volunteers to the American military meant that there was not enough weapons available for all involved. The first volunteers were given the best available weapons and later volunteers were given what was left and these weapons were mostly of poor quality. To rectify the supply problem, the Union looked to two sources for supply: domestic and European markets.

When the Union purchased weapons from the domestic market, some quality weapons were available, but there were problems with the weapons purchased. The need for weapons was so high that often the North was hasty in its purchases. Many profiteers took advantage of the Union's desperation and made a substantial profit from the sale of weapons. The nation paid an exorbitant price for many of the arms purchased domestically and this procedure generally made the rich richer. The worst case of abuse and fraud was when the United States purchased weapons that were once government owned. Within a year's time, the Federal Government sold weapons and bought the same weapons back at a much higher price. Not only did the Federal Government spend extra money for previously owned weapons, but the majority of these weapons was unusable.

The problem with the domestic markets lessened later in the war. In July of 1861, a special committee of Congress was formed to investigate the actions of fraud believed to be occurring. This committee concluded that wrongful acts were being committed and initiated actions to correct these actions from happening again. The measures set forth by

Congress and the actions of Quartermaster Meigs and Secretary Stanton brought order to a troubled supply system.

The Union went to Europe to help fill the void of weapons the military encountered. The European marketers also took advantage of the desperation of the Union and sold their worst weapons first. Later in the war, Europe began providing better quality weapons, but other problems existed. The weapons from Europe were not the same as the weapons already being used by the military. This non-standardization led to a problem of acquiring the necessary spare parts and ammunition. It was not uncommon for many European weapons to be used to make one workable firearm for the military. Cannibalization does enable an army to have some productive weapons, but the costs associated with it can also be high. Usually cannibalization results in fewer weapons overall and less in supply. The United States stopped purchasing weapons from Europe in 1863, but for years the supply system had to adjust and support many types of weapons. The purpose of having standardized weapons was to lessen supply problems. Standard weapons made repair and resupply easier also. By purchasing weapons from other sources, standardization is not possible, but in times of war, it is some times necessary to do whatever is possible to ensure victory.

The supply system had to make many adjustments throughout the war because it was not adequate at the beginning of the war. The nation was deficient in many areas of supply when the war began. As the war progressed, the Union was able to find other sources of supply in domestic and European markets. Many of the items purchased were poor and shoddy, but the Union was able to purchase what was needed to sustain a

successful war campaign. Without the purchases from these additional sources, the nation would not have been able to survive the war. Through hard work and resourceful personnel, the Union adjusted the supply system to be what was needed at the time and what was needed to win a war.

Research Question 4. How successful was the Union Army able to convert from peacetime to war?

The transition from peace to war is never an easy endeavor and for the Union, the transition from peacetime to the Civil War was a difficult chore. Overall the Union was successful in converting to a war time nation despite several problems encountered along way. In the nation's previous wars, the United States relied on the state militias to provided extra support. The Civil War marked the beginning of the end of the militia system in the United States. Before the war began, the Union Army was small and spread from the Pacific to Atlantic Oceans, therefore the Army was dependent on others to enhance its military capability. The militias were a strong addition to the military, but could not provide all that was necessary. By the end of the war, the militia system was for all practical purposes, non-existent. Volunteers added the men needed to fight the war.

There was no lack of want to help the Union's cause. Thousands of men volunteered their services to fight the war against the South. This abundance of men did cause problems in maneuvering the men into position to fight the war and also in providing supplies to support the soldiers. Camps to house the men awaiting the war

were nonexistent at the beginning. Many of the first arriving troops built the camps. The support for the amount of men thrust upon the system was not there. The nation was in such a hurry to deter the enemy to the South that the initial thought was to get the men and support them later. At times this is necessary, but it nearly always causes problems. However, it was not long until the initial rough conditions got better and the soldiers were better received.

The supply support at the beginning of the Civil War was in dire straits. The nation did not have enough weapons or clothing to provide for the new volunteers when the war started. New sources of supply were found and it was not long until the Union was able to supply the soldiers. However, many times the supplies were not of the best quality. Overall, the Union was able to adapt and except for paying high prices for some items and the receipt of poor quality in others, was able to convert the nation from peacetime to war.

Research Question 5. What are the lessons that today's military can learn from the actions taken to mobilize and supply the Union Army during the early stages of the Civil War?

For many years, the Civil War has been analyzed and dissected. From this examination, many military insights have been extracted. From tactics to strategy, the Civil War has served as a basis and framework for future generations. When it comes to logistics, the Civil War can also provide valuable information for future military members and especially for the military of today. It is often said that if you don't learn

by what has happened in the past, you are condemned to repeat the mistakes. By studying the Civil War, the nation and the military of today can learn how to do more with less and not make the same mistakes committed by the Union and its leaders during the initial stages of the Civil War and beyond.

In terms of mobilization, today's military is by far better prepared than the Union was when the Civil War began. This is not to say that the military would be prepared to fight any type of war. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United States, in compliance with the directives of the United Nations, responded and dispelled the army of Iraq. The nation responded well and won the war, but did not do so on its own. The help of many nations was required to bring victory. If a war or military actions occurs and we are not able to receive help from other sources, would the United States be prepared to fight on its own?

The answer to this question depends on the scope of the war. The Gulf War was won relatively easily and did not require millions of soldiers. Because of the size of this war, the United States was able to force Iraq from Kuwait and win the war. If a war develops that requires millions of troops, many times more than are currently active or in the reserve or guard, the United States would have to scramble to find the men and women necessary to fight the war. The Civil War was such a war. The war caused the nation to respond with many soldiers and to do so in a short period of time. The military today has a large standing military and, similar to the militia during the Civil War, has a reserve force to call upon in the event of a war, but many more people would be required to fight a war on such a large scale. The Civil War provides an example of a period of

American history when the nation had to mobilize millions of men to fight a war. In the event the military of today had to enter into a large war, the lessons learned during the Civil War would prove to be invaluable. From how the troops were mobilized, to transforming a small army into a large one, to supplying this new influx of soldiers, the Civil War can serve as an example. The leaders during the Civil War had to learn what to do to transform from peace to war and the lessons they learned can aid the civilian and military leaders of today.

The United States during the time of Civil War was different than the nation today, but there are similarities nonetheless. Before the Civil War began, the framework of the officer corps changed. The military was becoming a more professional organization. Today the military, and especially the Air Force, is more professional than ever before. This change in attitude requires an adjustment especially in times of war. An integration of the members of the active duty military and those who would be called upon during time of war requires special handling. The military during the Civil War had to make this adjustment and would provide an example for today.

At the beginning of the Civil War, the Union's military was spread from ocean to ocean. Today's military is spread over the world. The numbers of overseas bases are decreasing, but the American presence is world wide. What is similar in this example is that in time of major war, a nation has to pull all of its resources together. The Union had to organize its soldiers from coast to coast, and the United States would have to organize troops to a central location to fight in the event of hostilities from a major war. Both cases require a large amount of logistics and planning. The actions taken by the Union

should serve as a template for today and again the Civil War is a good example for today's military.

Along with the mobilization of troops, the Civil War should be used in the area of supply. The large influx of personnel into the armed forces caused the Union to deal with a logistics nightmare. Imagine the nation today going to war on the scale of the Civil War. Many questions would pop into the heads of the leaders of the nation: What supplies are on hand to supply the new troops? Where can we go to get more supplies if and when they are needed? Do we have the ability to convert from peacetime to war and make clothing and equipment necessary for the war? Many more questions would need to be answered to evaluate the supply system of today, but these serve as examples. The military during the Civil War had to answer these questions and did so successfully to win the war. Today's military can look back to the Civil War and learn what worked and what did not. By doing this, today's leaders can make sure the mistakes of the past are not repeated.

When the Civil War began, the nation was not prepared. The supplies available were not adequate to supply the soldiers and new sources were needed. The years that preceded the war showed a nation who did not believe in any threat to the country. The leaders of the nation were slow to upgrade the military's weapons and reduced the number of available depots. The nation did not have sufficient weapons for all of the troops and many of the weapons were of poor quality. The Congress, as always, held the purse strings of the nation and was bound and determined to limit the size of the military.

Many people warned of the shortages, but these words went unheeded and when the war began, the nation was not prepared and not ready to fight a war on such a grand scale.

Similar actions are happening today. The nation today believes that with the apparent fall of our Cold War nemesis, the Soviet Union, that there is no major threat to the country. According to the *Air Force Magazine*, as of September 1996, the average age of the Air Force active-duty aircraft is 17.9 years (1997: 49). This number indicates an aging fleet of airplanes. The Air Force is in the process of developing new aircraft including the F-22 Raptor and the Joint Strike Fighter, but both are still in development. The possibility exists that Congress could cancel one or possibly both programs. As with the Civil War and the rifle, Congress is holding back on advancements to upgrade the nation's weapons. If one or both of these programs are closed down, the nation would be at a disadvantage in the event of a major world war. The nation learned once what can happen when not prepared. The events and actions taken during the Civil War should not be forgotten as the years go by.

There are some differences between the current military situation and the one that in existence during the Civil War. Despite these differences, the actions taken during the Civil War can serve as a guide of what not to do or in some cases changed the way military activities are conducted today. The military relied on volunteers and the militia to support the actions of war. These men made up approximately 94% percent of the soldiers who fought for the Union during the war. Today it might be more difficult to rely on a volunteer force. If a major war were to occur, the people of the country would probably respond with their support. The nation would have to rely more upon the draft

then it did during the Civil War. Currently the draft does not exist, but with selective service, the men could be called if needed. Unlike the time of the Civil War, the nation of today has used a draft before and despite protests to its use, it was successful. Regardless of the reactions of the American people, the military can't rely on the citizen's goodwill and must prepare for all possible contingencies.

A key example of the actions taken during the Civil War in which today's military and nation can learn from is in the area of fraud and corruption. The Civil War necessitated quick actions by the nation to procure the items needed. The nation needed to procure arms, clothing, and other supplies to provide for all of the troops. Because of the urgency of the nation's needs, many laws and/or procedures were ignored. A result of this was fraud and corruption by many individuals and businesses. Later in the war, Congress investigated in depth the scandals in the military and made changes in personnel and laws governing procurement. Many of these laws are the same as the nation has today. The nation learned from the mistakes made during the war and attempted to prevent these fraudulent actions from happening today. When a war happens without warning, as many do, the first instinct is to procure what is needed. The laws set forth today help prevent the illegal activities that occurred during the Civil War from happening today. The rough times endured by the nation during the war against the South serves as an example of what not to do and what can be done to prevent the acts from reoccurring.

In the simplest terms, the Civil War shows that an army small in size and widely spread apart can increase the number of troops involved and improvise and adapt to

overcome obstacles presented to it. The military of today continues to reduce in size and the military is required by doctrine to fight multiple battles across the globe. The military is capable of fighting these multiple wars, but if a large war occurs in a central location as did the Civil War, the nation would have to pull its resources to this one locale. This would not be an easy accomplishment, but by learning from the past, the military can survive and adapt to what is needed. The Civil War serves as an example of the nation pulling its resources and finding what is needed to meet the goals. Today's military can learn from the actions taken in this effort and use them to their advantage.

When the time comes for today's military to enter another war with the limited resources available, the military leaders of the nation have many questions to ask. Is the country prepared for the war? How many troops are required to ensure victory of the nation and how are the troops going to be mobilized? Are the supplies available enough to sustain an army for a war of any length? All of these questions are of vital importance to military, but there are places the leaders can look for possible answers to what to do and what not to do. The nation and its leaders can look at the Civil War and learn. The nation can learn from what worked and what failed and design the military tactics accordingly. Times are quite different now then they were in the 1860s, but some things have not changed. Some of the patterns the nation and the military in particular have followed in recent years parallel the events leading up to the Civil War. The past provides invaluable instruction to future events and what we gain from the past can be inestimable assets for today and the future.

Conclusion

This thesis discusses the logistical aspects of the Civil War with a concentration on the Union Army of the North. This work focuses on the mobilization and supply efforts of the North. Before the war began, the Union did not have a comprehensive logistics system. When the war began, the North had serious obstacles to overcome in order to properly mobilize and supply the troops. The nation relied on the states' militia and volunteers from individuals willing to give their all for the war cause. The military was also limited on the amount of available supplies and new sources had to be found.

Over the first years of the war, the logistics system of the North had to change and adapt to the changing environment of the war. The Union could no longer rely on volunteers and instead had to draft the men necessary to fight a successive military campaign. The supply system sought relief from their shortages from domestic markets and from the European community. These markets at times provided poor quality goods and the individuals in charge of these markets committed fraud against the government. These abuses set forth changes in the American procurement system that are still relevant today.

The Civil War was a troubling time in American history, but the North adapted to the situation and found what was needed for the war effort. The actions by the Union during the initial stages of the American Civil War can and should be used as a template for generations to come.

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13. ABSTRACT (<i>Maximum 200 Words</i>) This thesis studies the logistics involved in mobilizing and supplying the Union Army at the onset of the Civil War. The main elements discussed are the sources, procedures, and items needed for the mobilization and supply efforts. Initially, the Union relied on the States to mobilize the military with the majority of the military being militia members or volunteers. The number of volunteers declined later in the war and the Union used both the bounty system and the draft for recruitment. Eventually, the Federal Government replaced the States as the primary mobilizing entity. The military needed supplies of weapons, clothing, and food. Again the States were the primary providers of supplies. The Union later used domestic and foreign markets for supplies, but the urgency of the nation spawned fraud and corruption. Additionally, the majority of the supplies provided were not adequate for the environment of war. By the end of war, corruption decreased and quality increased. Today's military can use the actions of the Union as guidance of what to do and what not to do in the time of war. The actions of the Union during the Civil War should be used as a template for future generations.				
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